Western New England University School of Law

Digital Commons @ Western New England University School of
Law
Faculty Scholarship

Faculty Publications

1996

Nicotine Withdrawal: Assessing the FDA's Effort to
Regulate Tobacco Products
Lars Noah
University of Florida Levin College of Law

Barbara A. Noah
Westen New England University School of Law, bnoah@law.wne.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/facschol
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, and the Health Law Commons
Recommended Citation
48 Ala. L. Rev. 1 (1996)

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Digital Commons @ Western New England University School of
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Western New England University
School of Law. For more information, please contact pnewcombe@law.wne.edu.

ALABAMA LAW REVIEW
Volume 48

Fall 1996

Number 1

NICOTINE WITHDRAWAL: AsSESSING THE FDA's
EFFORT TO REGULATE TOBACCO PRODUCTS
Lars Noah·
Barbara A. Noah··

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.
II.

INTRODUCTION. . • • . • • • • • • • . • • • • • • • . • • • • • • ••
STATUTORY OBJECTIONS TO THE REGULATIONS ••••.

A.

B.
C.

3
7

Jurisdiction to Regulate
Tobacco Products . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 9
1. FDA Authority Over Drugs .......... 9
2. FTC Authority Over Tobacco
Products ................... . . .. 15
Tobacco Products as Medical
Devices ........................... 21
Tobacco Products as "Restricted"
Medical Devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 27

* Assistant Professor, University of Florida College of Law. B.A., 1986; J.D.,
1990, Harvard University.
** Adjunct Professor, Health Care Law, University of Florida College of Health
Related Professions. B.A., 1987, Union College; J.D., 1990, Harvard University.
1

Alabama Law Review

2

D.

III.

IV.

V.

[Vol. 48:1:1

FDA Authority to Regulate Advertising of
Restricted Devices ................... 32
CONSEQUENCES OF A DEVICE DESIGNATION . . . . . .. 38
Compliance with Generally Applicable
A.
Device Requirements ................. 38
1. Adulteration and Misbranding
Prohibitions .................... 38
2. Classification and Approval for
Marketing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 41
3. Disclosure of Trade Secret
Information .................... 45
B.
The Preemption Dimension ............ 47
1. The Existing Defense Against
Failure-to-Warn Claims ........... 48
2. Broader Preemption for Device
Manufacturers .................. 51
CONSTITUTIONAL OBJECTIONS TO THE REGULATIONS 54
A.
Government Interest in Controlling
Tobacco Advertising. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 55
B.
The Nexus Between Means and End ..... 56
C.
Special Concerns About Industry-Funded
Counteradvertising .................. 60
CONCLUSION. . . . • . . . . . • • . • . • . . • • • . . • . . • • •. 62

1996]

Tobacco Regulations

3

I. INTRODUCTION

At a press conference held on August 23, 1996, just one year
after initially revealing his plans,l President Clinton announced
sweeping federal regulations to combat the underage use of
tobacco products. 2 The Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
subsequently published a lengthy preamble to accompany the
final regulations, detailing the Agency's assessment of the prob
lem and responding to numerous public comments to its notice
of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).3 Characterizing the growing
use of tobacco products as a "pediatric disease," FDA Commis
sioner David Kessler previously had vowed to alter the smoking
habits of the newest generation of tobacco users in order to "rad
ically reduce the incidence of smoking-related death and dis
ease."4
The tobacco regulations deal with both cigarettes and
smokeless tobacco products, and they focus primarily on the
advertising, sale, and distribution of these products to children
and adolescents.5 Among other things, the regulations establish
1. See Todd S. Purdam, Teenagers and Tobacco: Clinton Proposes Broad Plan
to Curb Teen-Age Snwking, N_Y_ TIMES, Aug. 11, 1995, at AI; see also 60 Fed. Reg.
41,314 (1995) (notice of proposed rulemaking); 60 Fed. Reg. 41,453 (1995) (accompa
nying jurisdictional statement).
2. See Peter Kilborn, Clinton Approves a Series of Curbs on Cigarette Ads, N.Y.
TIMEs, Aug. 24, 1996, at 1; Claudia MacLachlan, Tobacco's Road is Snwoth: FDA
Regs Face Legal Fight, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 9, 1996, at B1.
3. See 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,616-18 (1996) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt.
897).
4. Suein L. Hwang et al., FDA Seeks to Mount Attack on Smoking by Minors
That Could Mean Regulation, WALL ST. J., July 13, 1995, at A3. In the preamble,
the FDA cites 1994 figures from the Surgeon General's office indicating that more
than three million American adolescents currently smoke cigarettes and that an
additional one million adolescent males use smokeless tobacco. See 61 Fed. Reg. at
44,398, 44,421-22. The Centers for Disease Control (CDC) recently released a state
by-state compilation of smoking patterns. The report indicates very high rates of
teenage tobacco use in some parts of the United States. See Dana M. Shelton et al.,
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, State Laws on Tobacco Con
trol-United States, 1995, 44 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP., No. SS·6, Nov. 3,
1995, at 24-25; see also Barnaby J. Feder, Increase in Teen·Age Snwking Sharpest
Among Black Males, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1996, at A20 (reporting that the CDC's
latest survey indicated that almost 35% of persons age 17 and under had admitted
smoking in the previous month as compared with 30% just three years earlier).
5. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,397-99, 44,422-24. The FDA also published as an
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a federal mmlDlUm age for the purchase of tobacco products,
prohibit some vending machine sales, and limit the format and
content of, as well as the conditions under which minors are
exposed to, tobacco product advertising. 6 The Agency also plans
to require that the tobacco industry undertake a substantial
educational program aimed at minors to provide information
about the harmful consequences of·using tobacco products and to
counteract the appealing images associated with tobacco use in
recent advertising campaigns. 7
In originally announcing these initiatives, President Clinton
had invited Congress to intercede with a legislative response. 8
In fact, Mr. Clinton suggested that Congress would have only
ninety days to respond if it wished to prevent finalization of the
regulations. 9 The FDA frequently extends comment periods,
however, and it did so in this case. 10 Moreover, before issuing a
final rule, an agency must consider fuLd prepare responses to all
material comments received. 11 For a relatively simple proposal,

"annex" a separate document whi~h more fully set Qut its legal arguments for as
serting jurisdiction over tobacco products. See 61 Fed. Reg. 44,619 (1996) (jurisdic
tional statement); see also id. at 45,274 n.1227 (explaining that the Agency employed
notice-and-comment rulemaking proc~dures in formulating its jurisdictional. analysis
even though not required to do so). It is not clear why the FDA proceeded in this
fashion, unless perhaps it thought that a notice asserting its claim for jurisdiction
over tobacco products might have some independent significance.
6. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,396-97 (summarizing the new regulations). Most of
the restrictions will take effect after one year, except the age limitation will apply in
six months, while the prohibition on brand-name spqnsorship will not take effect for
two years. See id. at 44,542-43 (noting that manuf!!cturers also will have two years
to comply with the registration, listing, and good manufacturing practice require
ments applicable to all medical devices).
7. See id. at 44,538, 44,590.
8. See Teenagers and Tobacco: Excerpts from Clinton News Conference on His
Tobacco Order, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1995, at A18.
9. See President's Anti-Smoking Initiative Faces Formidable Challenges, BALT.
SUN, Aug. 11, 1995, at 14A (noting that Mr. Clinton urged Congress to use the 90
day comment period to develop comprqmise legislation).
10. The comment period originally closed on November 9, 1995, but was later
extended to January 2, 1996. See .60 Fed. Reg. 53,560 (1995). The Agency then
briefly reopened the comment period in late March. See 61 Fed. Reg. 11,349 (1996);
61 Fed. Reg. 11,419 (1996); Timothy Noah & Suein L. Hwang, Philip Morris, in
Voluminous Comment, Denies Manipulating Cigarette Nicotine, WALL ST. J., Apr. 23,
1996, at A24.
11. Guarantees of public participation would be meaningless unless agencies
honestly considered and responded to significant comments on proposals. See, e.g.,
St. James Hosp. v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 1460, 1470 (7th Cir. 1985); Home Box Office,
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this process might take weeks OJ;' months, while, for more com
plex and controversial proposals such as the tobacco NPRM, this
process might take years to complete;12 indeed, some proposals
are never finalized. 13
In light of the clearly exaggerated urgency of the matter and
the radical nature of the FDA's proposals, some commentators
viewed the announcement as no more· than a political gesture, a
threat made with the hope of forcing Congress' hand. 14 In fact,
the FDA previously had asked Congress for guidance on the
matter/5 although that had occurred before the mid-term elec
tions gave the Republican Party a majority in Congress. In the
past, Congress has been notoriously hesitant to enact legislation
controlling tobacco products,16 and it did not initially react to
the proposals, evidently waiting to see if the FDA's threat of
action was serious.17
The tobacco industry, itself under siege from various fronts

Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 35 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
12. Cf. M. Elizabeth Magill, Congressional Control Over Agency Rulemaking: The
Nutrition Labeling and Education Act's Hammer Provisions, 50 FOOD & DRUG L.J.
149, 165-70 (1995) (describing the FDA's failure to meet strict congressional
deadlines for the issuance of final nutrition labeling regulations).
13. See, e.g., 56 Fed. Reg. 67,440 (1991) (withdrawing 89 FDA proposals, most of
which had been pending for more than ten years).
14. See Claudia MacLachlan, FDA Draws First in Tobacco Wars, NAT'L L.J.,
Aug. 28, 1995, at AI, A21.
15. See Regulation of Tobacco Products (Part 1): Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Health and the Environment of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d
Congo 33 (1994) (statement -of David A Kessler, Commissioner of Food and Drugs)
("On these issues we seek guidance from the Congress."); Anita Manning, Smoking
Under Fire from the FDA and Others, USA TODAY, Mar. 29, 1994, at 6D.
16. See Wayne Hearn, Anti-Smoking Group Gives Government Bad Grades,
AMER. MED. NEWS, Feb. 7, 1994, at 20 (noting that Congress failed to pass almost
all of the 1,000 tobacco control bills introduced over a 30-year period); infra note 59
(listing several unenacted bills which would have given the FDA regulatory authority
over tobacco products).
17. See Barnaby J. Feder, Big Tobacco Victory Creates Joy and Profit on Wall
Street, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1996', at D1, D8 ("[A]nalysts expect Congress, as long as
it is Republican-controlled, to deny the [FDA] the funds it would need to follow
through."); Timothy Noah, Smoke Under Fire: Controversy Over. Wigand Reflects
Broader Government War on Tobacco, WAIL ST. J., Feb. 2, 1996, at A12 ("Republi
cans . • . are poised to press legislation to block an ambitious [FDA] rule, but are
holding back in hopes that a federal judge strikes it down first."). A number of bills
were introduced shortly after the FDA announced its proposals. See, e.g., S. 1262,
104th Congo (1995); S. 1295, 104th Congo (1995); H.R. 2283, 104th Congo (1995);
H.R. 2414, 104th Congo (1995).

6

Alabama Law Review

[Vol. 48:1:1

over the last few years,t8 took the threat seriously, both in fil
ing extensive comments with the FDA19 and in launching pre
emptive judicial challenges to the Agency's assertion of jurisdic
tion. 20 For his part, President Clinton capitalized on the under
age use of tobacco as a campaign issue-his Republican chal
lenger, Bob Dole, was sharply criticized for his earlier opposition
to the initiative. 21
Although the broad public health goals underlying the regu
lations seem unassailable, there are serious doubts about the
Agency's assertion of legal authority to regulate tobacco products
in the manner selected. The FDA's initiative could still force a
rapid legislative response,22 but this depends in part on how
18. See, e.g., Noah, supra note 17, at A12 ("[T]he government is waging a war
of attrition against the tobacco industry. Taking place at both the federal and state
levels, the war also includes a number of private civil actions . . . ."). Several states
have filed suit against companies to recover costs associated with health care for
residents with tobacco-related illnesses. See Jonathan S. Massey, The Florida To·
bacco Liability Law: Fairy Tale Objectrons to a Reasonable Solution to Florida's
Medicaid Crisis, 46 FLA. L. REv. 591 (1994); Andrew A. Skolnick, Spate of Lawsuits
May Finally Find Chink in Tobacco Industry's "Impenetrable Armor,· 273 JAMA
1080 (1995).
19. See Noah, supra note 17, at A12 ("Currently, the FDA is reviewing 700,000
public comments on the rule, more than the agency has ever received on any single
regulation, the majority of them negative."). On the final day of the comment period,
the Tobacco Institute and five of the major cigarette manufacturers filed 2,000 pages
of comments and 45,000 pages of footnotes and other documentation arguing against
the proposed regulations. See 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,418 (1996); 61 Fed. Reg.
44,619, 45,272 (1996) (jurisdictional statement); Timothy Noah, Cigarette Firms
Challenge FDA's Right to Restrict Minors' Access to Tobacco, WAll. ST. J., Jan. 2,
1996, at B8.
20. See, e.g., Coyne Beahm, Inc. v. FDA, No. 2:95CV0059 (M.D.N.C. filed Aug.
10, 1995); see also Barnaby J. Feder, Tobacco Curbs Face Legal Fight, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 24, 1996, at 8 (describing the predicted course of pending lawsuits in the wake
of the FDA's recent finalization of the regulations). Other questionable FDA decisions
often are not formally challenged because a company may fear alienating the Agen
cy. See Allegatrons of FDA Abuses of Authority: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight and Investigatrons of the House Comm. on Commerce, 104th Congo (1995).
21. See Judi Hasson, Debate Centers on Economy, Government Role, USA TODAY,
Oct. 7, 1996, at 12A ("Clinton charged [in the first Presidential debate] that Dole
sided with tobacco companies when the administration tried to block cigarette sales
and advertising to minors."); Timothy Noah, Dole's Remarks on Tobacco Addition
Leave Him Open to Savage Criticism, WAll. ST. J., July 5, 1996, at A8; Dole Oppos
es FDA's Steps to Regulate Tobacco Items, WALL ST. J., June 14, 1996, at A16.
22. Under a recently enacted procedure, Congress gets 60 days after the publica
tion of a "major" rule to introduce a joint resolution of disapproval, and then it has
60 session days in which to vote on the resolution under "fast track" procedures
(which, among other things, substantially limit the opportunity for amendments and
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persuasive one finds the Agency's assertion that it has the legal
authority to issue the rules. This Article will critically evaluate
claims that the FDA has exceeded statutory and constitutional
limitations on its power.
Part II focuses on objections to the Agency's claim that it
can regulate the advertising of tobacco products using the spe
cial statutory provisions applicable to restricted medical devices.
The FDA argues that nicotine qualifies as a drug because tobac
co companies intend that consumers become addicted to nicotine
containing products. Even if true, the Agency still must justify
the assertion of authority over products traditionally regulated
by another agency, and then it must explain the counterintuitive
classification of tobacco products as medical devices, and also as
restricted devices, rather than as drugs.
Part III canvasses some of the apparently unanticipated
consequences of this device classification, including the possibili
ty that cigarette manufacturers may enjoy a broader preemption
defense in tort lawsuits. Finally, Part IV addresses the relative
strength of some of the various constitutional objections raised
by the industry, particularly with regard to the advertising re
strictions and the proposed industry-financed educational cam
paign. Ultimately, this Article concludes that the FDA regula
tions exceed the Agency's delegated authority and that the pro
posed educational campaign contravenes the First Amendment.

II. STATUTORY OBJECTIONS TO THE REGULATIONS
During the last quarter of a century, the FDA has been
notoriously creative in construing its own statutory authority. In
the early 1970s, high level Agency officials expressed the view
that the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FD&C Act)23
represents a broad "constitution" authorizing the FDA to protect
the public health by any necessary and proper means, rather

filibusters). See Contract With America Advancement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104
121, § 251, 110 Stat. 868 (to be codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 801-808). The FDA desig
nated its new regulation as a "major" rule subject to this procedure. See 61 Fed.
Reg. at 44,615. Of course, the President ultimately would remain free to veto any
such resolution of disapproval.
23. Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified
as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-395 (1994».
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than a limited and precise delegation of Congress' legislative
power.24 Some might applaud the Agency for its adaptability to
changing circumstances, but others have credibly accused it of
overreaching and arbitrariness.25
Although courts show significant deference to an agency's
interpretation of its statutory authority,26 they need not coun
tenance expansive constructions of an agency's regulatory juris
diction. 27 For the most part, the courts have not rebuffed the
24. See Peter Barton Hutt, Philosophy of Regulation Under the Federal Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act, 28 FOOD DRUG COSMo L.J. 177, 178 (1973) ("[T]he Act must
be regarded as a constitution. . . . The mission of the [FDA] is to implement [its
fundamental] objectives through the most effective and efficient controls that can be
devised."); see also United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 280 (1943) (suggest
ing that the FD&C Act be treated as "a working instrument of government and not
merely as a collection of English words").
25. See, e.g., 62 Cases of Jam v. United States, 340 U.S. 593, 600 (1951) ("In
our anxiety to effectuate the congressional purpose of protecting the public, we must
take care not to extend the scope of the statute beyond the point where Congress
indicated it would stop."); Southeastern Minerals, Inc. v. Harris, 622 F.2d 758, 767
(5th Cir. 1980) (criticizing the FDA's "bureaucratic hubris that confuses abuse of
power with reason"); United States v. Parkinson, 240 F.2d 918, 921 (9th Cir. 1956)
("The record of the past few decades is replete with examples of the tendency of
executive agencies to expand their field of operations. A passion and a zeal to
crusade affects their operations."); H. Thomas Austern, Philosophy of Regulation: A
Reply to Mr. Hutt, 28 FOOD DRUG COSMo L.J. 189, 191 (1973) (criticizing the sugges
tion that "a well-motivated administrative agency can legally do what it alone deems
desirable unless Congress has in advance specifically prohibited it"); James D.
Poliquin, Comment, The Incremental Development of an Extra-Statutory System of
Regulation: A Critique of Food and Drug Administration Regulation of Added Poi
sonous and Deleterious Substances, 33 ME. L. REv. 103, 103 (1981) ("[T]he agency
has chosen to take advantage of the statute's ambiguity to enhance its regulatory
powers, often assigning strained interpretations of the statute to advance the
agency's perceived goals.").
26. See, e.g., NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 115 S.
Ct. 810, 813-15 (1995); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984); see also Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to
Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 980-93 (1992); Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopat
ed Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency Interpreta
tions of Statutes, 73 TEX. L. REV. 83, 94-103 (1994).
27. See, e.g., Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex reI. Moore, 487
U.S. 354, 386 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Our agency deference cases have
always been limited to statutes the agency was 'entrusted to administer.''') (quoting
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844); Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Dimension
Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 368 (1986) (rejecting Federal Reserve's interpretation of its
statutory jurisdiction as including institutions offering NOW accounts); see also
Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U.
Cm. L. REv. 123, 185-87 (1994); Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After
Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 2071, 2097-2101 (1990).
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FDA's self-serving and generous claims of power. In recently
promulgating its tobacco regulations, however, the Agency may
have crossed the line. In doing so, it has diverted scarce resourc
es and may have unwittingly imperiled its core missions.28

A Jurisdiction to Regulate Tobacco Products
The FDA's jurisdiction to regulate cigarettes and smokeless
tobacco products depends on answers to a couple of questions.
First, do tobacco products fit within one of the many product
categories over which the Agency exercises authority? The FDA
contends that nicotine satisfies the definition of the term "drug"
because of its addictive effect coupled with evidence of the
industry's intent that it affect the structure or function of the
body in this manner.29 Second, even if one accepts the FDA's
asserted product categorization, did Congress nonetheless mean
to reserve jurisdiction over tobacco product labeling and adver
tising for an agency other than the FDA, namely, the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC)? These questions are taken up in turn
below.

1. FDA Authority Over Drugs.-Under the FD&C Act, a
"drug" is any "article[] intended for use in the diagnosis, cure,
mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in man ... [or]
intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of
man."30 The mere presence of a chemically active substance
would not satisfy this definition;31 the manufacturer must in
28. See Benjamin Wittes, Tobacco Lobby Keeps on Smoking, LEGAL TIMES, Apr.
15, 1996, at 1, 5 (describing tobacco industry's congressional lobbying strategy as
emphasizing the FDA's diversion of resources from other important regulatory
activities); M-D-D-I REPORTS ("The Gray Sheet"), Jan. 8, 1996, at I&W-3 ("Personnel
reassignments to the tobacco initiative have filtered down to the FDA Center level,
with the Commissioner's office pulling at least one staff member from each of the
agency's centers . . . . [p]rogress on farther-term device reg[ulation]s could be slowed
by the tobacco effort."); see also 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,598 (1996) ("FDA projects
that between 30 to 50 full-time employees (FTE's) will be needed to implement the
rule.").
29. The Agency's collateral argument that tobacco products are "medical devices"
under the Act, which is discussed in Part II.B, infra, depends entirely on its thresh
old claim that the nicotine delivered by such products qualifies as a drug.
30. 21 U.S.C. § 32ICgX1XB), (C) (1994).
31. See Action on Smoking & Health v. Harris, 655 F.2d 236, 239-41 (D.C. Cir.
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tend that the substance serve a therapeutic purpose or other
wise affect the structure or function of the body.32 Thus, a
product's intended use, rather than its formulation, determines
whether it is a drug, even when the product is introduced into,
or has some chemical effect upon, the body. The intended use of
a product typically is determined by its labeling and any other
promotional claims. 33
In the past, the FDA has asserted jurisdiction over tobacco
products only when they were accompanied by therapeutic
claims.34 The Agency also has declined to regulate "smokeless"

1980) (holding that cigarettes are not drugs simply because they affect the structure
or function of the body unless tMy were intended to be used for this purpose).
"[C]onsumers must use the product predominantly-and in fact nearly exclu
sively-with the appropriate intent before the requisite statutory intent can be
inferred." Id. at 240; see also FrC v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 108 F. Supp.
573, 576-77 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), affd, 203 F.2d 955 (2d Cir. 1953).
32. The "structure or any function" definitions of drugs and devices apply only
to products which literally claim to change the physical structure of the body or to
alter one or more of its basic functions. See E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. V. Bowen, 870
F.2d 678, 682-83 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (noting that "the 'structure or . • . function' def
inition, unlike the 'disease in man' definition, is relatively narrow, and was not
intended to encompass all articles that might have some remote physical effect upon
the body"); United States V. Article .•. "Sudden Change," 409 F.2d 734, 741 (2d
Cir. 1969) (holding that lotion claiming to create a "face lift" purports to affect the
structure or function of the body and is therefore a drug); United States V. An Arti
cle ... "Line Away," 415 F.2d 369, 371-72 (3d Cir. 1969) (same); Orthopedic Equip.
CO. V. Eutsler, 276 F.2d 455, 459 (4th Cir. 1960) (holding that surgical nail inserted
into broken bone is a "device" within the meaning of the structure or function
definition); United States V. 23,. More or Less, Articles, 192 F.2d 308, 309 (2d Cir.
1951) (holding that phonograph record purporting to induce sleep is a "device" be
cause sleep is a function of the body).
33. See, e.g., United States v. Article of Drug ... B-Complex Cholinos Capsules,
362 F.2d 923, 925-26 (3d Cir. 1966) (radio broadcasts); Nature Food Centres, Inc. V.
United States, 310 F.2d 67, 70 (lst Cir. 1962) (public lectures); V.E. Irons, lnc. v.
United States, 244 F.2d 34, 44. (1st Cir. 1957) (oral representations made by autho
rized sales distributors); United States V. General Nutrition, Inc., 638 F. Supp. 556,
563-64 (W.D.N.Y. 1986) (same); Hanson V. United States, 417 F. Supp. 30, 35 (D.
Minn.), affd, 540 F.2d 947 (8th Cir. 1976); see also 21 C.F.R..§ 201.128 (1996)
(defining "intended use").
34. See United States V. 354 Bulk Cartons ... Trim Reducing-Aid Cigarettes,
178 F. Supp. 847, 851 (D.N.J. 1959) (holding that cigarettes purporting to reduce
appetite affect both the structure (body weight) and function (appetite) of the body};
United States V. 46 Cartons ... Fairfax Cigarettes, 113 F. Supp. 336, 337 (D.N.J.
1953) (holding that the FDA could regulate cigarettes as drugs where their labeling
clearly suggested that they would reduce the risk of colds and other infections); see
also Nutrilab, Inc. V. Schweiker, 7-13 F.2d. 335, 337-38 (7th Cir. 1983); Bradley V.
United States, 264 F. 79, 81-82 (5th Cir. 1920); United States V. An Article of
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cigarettes as drugs. Smokeless cigarettes heat rather than burn
tobacco and thus deliver nicotine into the body while substan
tially reducing the production and inhalation of other toxic sub
stances. After one tobacco company announced the development
of such a cigarette in 1987, two interested groups formally re
quested that the FDA classify the product as an "alternative
nicotine delivery product" subject to regulation as a drug. 35
Because the company soon withdrew the product from the mar
ket due to poor performance, the FDA declared the issue moot
and declined to rule on the petitions.36
Although the FDA has rejected previous requests that it
regulate all cigarettes as drugs,37 at least absent therapeutic
claims, this factual conclusion remains open to revision. 38 The

Drug .•• u.s. Fancy Pure Honey, 218 F. Supp. 208, 211 (E.D. Mich. 1963), affd,
344 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1965); S. REP. No. 73-493, at 2·3 (1934) ("The use to which a
product is put will determine the category into which it will fall . . • . The manu
facturer of the article, through his representations in connection with its sale, can
determine the use to which an article is to be put.").
35. See PETER BARTON HUTI' & RICHARD A. MERRILL, FOOD AND DRUG LAw 384
(2d ed. 1991) (describing petitions filed by the American Medical Association and the
Coalition on Smoking or Health); see also Health Consequences of Smoking: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Health and the Environment of the House Comm. on Energy
and Commerce. 100th Congo 163-64 (1988) (statement of Dr. John Slade) (concluding
that the smokeless cigarette will be "the most addictive form of nicotine ever de
vised," will attract novice smokers, and "may promote relapse to active nicotine
dependence"); Michael Waldholz & John Helyar, FDA Feels Heat on Smokeless
Cigarette, WALL ST. J., Oct. 21, 1988, at B1.
36. See HUTI' & MERRILL, supra note 35, at 384. Recently, R.J. Reynolds began
test marketing a new smokeless cigarette, though amid concerns that the FDA
might demand pre-market review. See Barnaby J. Feder, Ready to Test New Ciga
rette, Maker Fears Tough Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8. 1996, at A13; Suein L. Hwang
& Alix M. Freedman, Smokers May Mistake "Clean" Cigarette for Safe, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 30, 1996. at B1; see also Anthony Flint, Race Is on to Sell Nicotine Products,
BOSTON GLOBE, July 29, 1996, at Bl.
37. See, e.g., Action on Smoking & Health, 655 F.2d at 240 (Nicotine stimulates
the senses, but it does not affect the structure or any function of the body; although
any article which '"comes into contact with any of the senses may be said to be an
article intended to affect the functions of the body of man,'" Congress did not intend
the definition to be read so broadly.) (quoting FTC v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co.,
108 F. Supp. 573, 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), affd, 203 F.2d 955 (2d Cir. 1953» (internal
quotation omitted).
38. See id. at 242 n.10 ("Nothing in this opinion should suggest that the Admin
istration is irrevocably bound by any long-standing interpretation and representations
thereof to the legislative branch. An administrative agency is clearly free to revise
its interpretations. • • . [H]owever, it must provide a reasoned explanation for its
action."); see also 21 C.F.R. § 10.85(k) (1996); 61 Fed. Reg. 44,619, 45,219-21 (1996)
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FDA now believes that it has .accumulated sufficient evidence
proving that manufacturers intend that cigarettes and other
tobacco products be used to affect the structure or function of
the body. The Agency takes the position that tobacco products
are intended to satisfy the cravings of persons addicted to nico
tine. 39
In reaching this conclusion, the FDA relies in part on exten'
sive scientific evidence concerning the addictive nature of nico
tine. The FDA summarizes the scientiqc evidence demonstrating
the definable chemical effects that nicotine produces in the brain
of the user, including physiological dependence. 4o Further, it
describes studies documenting symptoms of smoking addiction
such as continued use despite knowledge of harmful consequenc
es, withdrawal symptoms .following abstinence, and continued
use despite repeated attempts to quit. 41 The Agency concludes
that consumers use tobacco products to satisfy addiction, noting
that between seventy-five and ninety-five percent of frequent
smokers meet the criteria for addiction established by public
health organizations. 42
Evidence of addictiveness would not, however, itself suffice
to support "drug" jurisdiction over tobacco products. In public
statements, tobacco industry execut~ves have argued that nico
tine simply improves flavor and does not affect the body of the
smoker. In a recent congressional hearing, one tobacco industry
executive testified that "nicotine contributes to the taste of ciga

(jurisdictional statement); Baltimore & A R.R. v. Washington Metro. Area Transit
Comm'n, 642 F.2d 1365, 1369-70 (p.C.. Cir. 1980); Bentex Pharms.; Inc. V. Richard·
son, 463 F.2d 363, 368 n.17 (4th Cir. 1972) ("FDA not only has the right but is
obligated to change its opinion if it learns its prior position was erroneous."), rev'd
on other grounds, 412 U.S. 645 (1973); International Union, United Auto. Aero. &
Agric. Implement Workers of America V. NLRB, 459 F.2d 1329, 1341 (D.C. Cir.
1972); AMP, Inc. V. Gardner, 275 F. Supp. 410, 412 n.1 ·(S.D.N.Y. 1967), affd, 389
F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1968); United States V. 60 28-Capsule Bottles ... "Unitrol," 211
F. Supp. 207, 215 (D.N.J. 1962).
39. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,628·30, 45,203-04. According to lawyers representing
plaintiffs in class action lawsuits, an FDA finding that cigarettes are addictive might
have a dramatic impact on pending claims against tobacco companies. See Milo
Geyelin, Does FDA's Power Extend to Cigarettes?, WALL ST. J., Aug. 4, 1995, at B7.
40. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,698-730.
41. See id. at 44,730·39.
42. See id. at 44,812-13, 44,831·55. The Agency also notes that consumers use
tobacco products in an effort to control their weight. See id. at 44,744.
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rettes and the pleasures of SIlJ,oking . . . [but] does not make
cigarettes a drug or smoking an addiction. n43 The Tobacco Insti
tute also insists that the manufacturing process focuses entirely
on improving taste, though recently publicized documents sug
gest otherwise.44
The FDA has obtained volumes of internal industry docu
ments which characterize nicotine as an addictive substance and
candidly describe tobacco products as drug delivery devices. 45
For example, one document bluntly" compared nicotine to mor
phine and cocaine, concluding that "the primary reason" people
smoke "is to deliver nicotine into their bodies."46 Moreover, re
cently Unearthed evidence suggests that the industry deliberate
ly targets the youth market.47
In addition, evidence suggests that cigarette manufacturers
deliberately manipulat.e nicotine levels. The FDA accuses vari:

43. Alix M. Freedman, Philip Morris Memo Likens Nicotine to Cocaine, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 8, 1995, at B14.
44. See Alix M. Freedman & Suein- L. Hwang, Why Don't Low-Tar Cigarettes
Have Lower Nicotine?, WALL ST. J., July 14, 1995, at B1; see also Milo Geyelin &
Alix M. Freedman, R.J. Reynolds Once Linked the Success of Rival Brand to "Nico
tine Kick" Boost, WALL ST. J., May 23, 1996, at B2.
45. See, e.g., 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,854-912, 45,100-08; id. at 44,856 (quoting the
following statement by one tobacco industry executive: "Think of the cigarette pack
as a storage container for a dais supply of nicotine. • . . Think of the cigarette as a
dispenser for a dose unit of nicotine. . . • Think of a puff of smoke as the vehicle of
nicotine . • • . Smoke is beyond question the most optimized vehicle of nicotine and
the cigarette the most optimized dispenser of smoke."); see also Stanton A. Glanz et
aI., Looking Through a Keyhole at the Tobacco -Industry: The Brown and Williamson
Documents, 274 JAMA 219 (1995); Alix M. Freedman & Suein L. Hwang, Tliree Ex
Employees Say Philip Morris Deliberately Controlled Nicotine Levels, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 19, 1996, at B1.
46. See Timothy Noah et al., Tobacco Industry Lambastes the FDA for Using
Too Many Secret Documents, WALL ST. J., Jan. 3, 1996, at B1, B2. A draft; report
from Philip Morris frankly acknowledges the drug status of nicotine and discusses in
scientific terms nicotine's 'effects on the brain: "CA] little nicotine seems to stimulate,
while a lot sedates a person. A smoker learns to control the delivery of nicotine
through the smoking technique to create the desired mood state." Freedman &
Hwang, supra note 44, at B1. The report also discusses "nicotine delivery products,"
mentioning cigarettes along with other products whose sole function is to deliver
nicotine into the body: "(N]icotine delivery devices range from snuff, chewing tobacco,
cigars, pipes and conventional cigarettes to unique smoking articles, chewing gum,
patches, aerosol sprays and inhalers." Id. at B14.
47. See 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,480-81 (1996); Tactics for Getting Kids to Smoke,
TAMPA TRIB., Nov. 10, 1995, at 18; Patricia Worklan, R:J. Reynolds' Secret Report
Targets Young Adult Market, CHI. TRIB., July 11, 1996, at 19.
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ous segments of the tobacco industry of using special processing
techniques' such as breeding high-nicotine tobacco leaves, pur
chasing leaves selectively to raise nicotine content, treating ciga
rettes with chemicals such as ammonia to enhance nicotine
absorption, adding nicotine-rich extracts from outside vendors
(though not in domestically-marketed products), and altering
nicotine levels in reconstituted tobacco.4B According to industry
journals, a number of companies engage in blending high-nico
tine American tobacco leaves with imported tobacco leaves "to
offset the dilution impact of bland foreign tobaccos," enabling
"manufacturers to attain the appropriate levels of nicotine in the
smoke and provide much of the flavor."49
Such evidence 'seriously undercuts the industry's assertion
that its sole concern is product flavor. Indeed, many of the "fla
vors" of tobacco products can be chemically "denicotinized."50
Although the industry has claimed that ·the ratio of nicotine to
tar is constant, recent FTC evaluations reveal a higher propor
tion of nicotine to tar in certain low-tar cigarettes. 51 Nonethe
less, the industry argues that the only valid evidence on which
the FDA can rely is a company's advertising claims and other
representations to the public.52 But if the Agency's allegations
48. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,915-94, 45,108-28. Evidence also points to genetic·
engineering as a means to manipulate tobacco plants' nicotine levels, and to careful
selection of high-nicotine leaves and other tobacco plant parts in creating various
tobacco blends. See id. at 44,937-38; Benjamin Wittes, The Tobacco Case the FDA
Wants to Make, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 23; 1995, at I, 11.
49. See Wittes, supra note 48, at 11-12.
50. See 60 Fed. Reg. 41,453, 41,779-84 (1995); Wittes, supra note 48, at 12, 14.
51. See Freedman & Hwang, supra note 44, at Bl. For example, a Marlboro
King filter cigarette had a nicotine-to-tar ratio of 0.069 in 1994, while a Marlboro
Lights king-sized filter cigarette had a ratio of 0.08, suggesting that the nicotine
level was deliberately raised in the "light" version to compensate for nicotine loss in
the tar-reduction process. See id.
52. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 45,151; see also Susan H. Carchman, Should the FDA
Regulate Nicotine-Containing Cigarettes? Has the Agency Established a Legal Basis
and, If Not, Should Congress Grant It?, 51 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 85, 114-32 (1996);
Ann M. Boeckman, Comment, An Exercise in Administrative Creativity: The FDA's
Assertion of Jurisdiction Over Tobacco, 45 CATH. U. L. REv. 991, 1025-30 (1996). The
FDA has, however, successfully relied on numerous other sources to divine intent,
see 61 Fed. Reg. at 45,152-70, including submissions to the Securities and Exchange
Commission and statements made in a company's patent applications, see HUTT &
MERRILL, supra note 35, at 386. In searching for evidence that tobacco companies
intend their products to affect the structure or function of the body, the FDA relies
in part on statements made in one company's patent application for its high-nicotine
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of industry manipulation of nicotine in tobacco products prove
supportable, then it may have acquired. the previously elusive
evidence of an intended drug use.
2. FTC Authority Over Tobacco Products.-Although nico
tine-the "active ingredient" in tobacco products-may now
technically be regarded as a drug, the FDA would not be able to
assert its authority at this juncture .if Congress has suggested
that some other agency has exclusive control over cigarettes and
smokeless tobacco products. To be sure, twice during the 1950s
the FDA successfully pursued enforcement actions against ciga
rettes promoted for therapeutic uses. 53 Subsequently enacted
legislation, "however, specifically reserved or delegated to the
Federal Trade Commission primary control over the ,advertising
of cigarettes and smokeless tobacco products. 54 Did Congress
thereby intend to exempt tobacco products from the FDA's con
trol? Absent some contrary intent, Congress is presumed to
grant priinary jurisdiction over a subject only to a single federal
agency. 55

tobacco product. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,937, 45,095.
53. See United States v." 354 Bulk Cartons .. ". Trim Reducing-Aid Cigarettes,
178 F. Supp. 847, 851 (D.N.J. 1959); United States v. 46 Cartons ... Fairfax
Cigarettes, 113 F. Supp. 336, 337 (D.N.J. 1953).
54. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 4402, 4405 -(1994) (smokeless tobacco products); cf. id.
§ 1336 ("Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to limit, restrict, expand, or
otherwise affect the authority of the Federal Trade Commission with respect to
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the a'dvertising of cigarettes."); FTC v. Brown
& Williamson Tobacco Corp., 778 F.2d 35, 37 (D.C. Cir. 1985). The FTC is now con
sidering revamping its cigarette tar and nicotine labeling requirements to reflect
more accurately the range of these chemicals in smoke from "light" cigarettes, which
can vary according to individual smoking style. See FTC Considers Tougher Labeling
Rules for Cigarette Ads, ATLANTA J. CONST., Dec. 29, 1995, at 6B. The Commission
also is contemplating enforcement actions against tobacco companies if it finds that
they are using tar and nicotine ratings in advertisements to mislead consumers.
55. See American Pharm. Ass'n v. Weinberger, 377 F. Supp. 824, 830·31 (D.D.C.
1974) (holding that Congress had delegated primary authority over controlled sub
stances to the Drug Enforcement Administration, and therefore invalidating- an FDA
effort to restrict the distribution of methadone), affd, 530 F.2d 1054 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
(per curiam); Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. Mathews, 435 F. Supp. 5, 12-17
(W.D. Ky. 1976) (holding that Congress had delegated primary authority over alco
holic beverages to BATF, thereby invalidating an FDA initiative to require ingredient
labeling); cf. Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144,
151·58 (1991) (holding that Congress had delegated interpretive authority to the
Secretary of Labor rather than the Commission); Breitmeyer v. Califano, 463 F.
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Although a number of federal safety statutes expressly ex
empt tobacco products,56 the FD&C Act was never amended to
exclude these products from the FDA's jurisdiction.57 Nonethe
less, the Agency repeatedly has disclaimed any general authority
to regulate cigarettes,56 and Congress apparently has failed to
enact any of the dozens of bills introduced during the last forty
years to grant the FDA such jurisdiction.59 Thus, Congress has
acquiesced in the FDA's longstanding interpretation of its very
limited authority over tobacco products under the FD&C Act. GO

Supp. 810, 816 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (holding that, where the FDA exercises jurisdiction,
its regulatory jurisdiction is exclusive). The Agency disagrees with this contention.
See 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,408, 44,415 n.31 (attempting to distinguish Weinberger); id.
at 44,547 ("Numerous Federal agencies have overlapping and complementary jurisdic
tion that arises from their differing missions and expertise.").
56. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1459(aX1) (1994) (exempting tobacco products from the
Fair Packaging and Labeling Act); 15 U.S.C. § 2052(aX1XB) (1994) (exempting
tobacco prQducts from coverage under the Consumer Product Safety Act); 15 U.S.C.
§ 2602(2XBXiii) (1994) (exempting tobacco products from the Toxic Substances
Control Act); 21 U.S.C. § 802(6) (1994) (exempting tobacco products from the Con
trolled Substances Act); see also James T. O'Reilly, A Consistent Ethic of Safety
Regulation: The Case for Improving Regulation of Tobacco Products, 3 ADMIN. L.J.
215 (1989).
57. The Dietary Supplement Health and Education.Act of 1994, which amends
the FD&C Act, happens to exclude "tobacco" from the new definition of "dietary sup
plement." Pub. L. No. 103-417, § 3(a), 108 Stat. 4327 (codified at 21 U.S.C.
§ 3.21(ft)(1) (1994».
58. See, e.g., Rural Development, Agriculture, and Related Agencies Appropria
tions for 1990 (Part 8): Hearings Before the House Comm. on Appropriations, 100th
Congo 409 (1989) (testimony of Frank Young, Commissioner of Food and Drugs);
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, 89th Congo 193 (1965).
59. See, e.g., H.R. 2147, .103d Congo (1993) (proposing to prohibit discount
coupOns and free samples of tobacco products; bar tobacco manufacturers from
sponsoring cultural, sports, or other. public events; require additional health warnings
on cigarette packages; and require that all cigarette additives be disclosed and
comply with FDA safety standards); S. 2298, 102d Congo (1992); H.R. 5041, 101st
Congo (1990); S. 769, 101st Congo (1989); H.R. 3294, 100th Congo (1987); H.R. 279,
96th Congo (1979); S. 3317, 95th Congo (1978); H.R. 2248, 89th Congo (1965);
S. 1682, 88th Congo .(1963); H.R. 11280, 84th Congo (1956); see also H.R. REP. NO.
98-805, at 12 (1984) ("Federal laws that protect the public from hazardous food,
drugs, and consumer products do not apply to cigarettes."); S. REP. No. 94-251, at
43 (1976) ("[A]ny further regulation in this sensitive and complex area must be
reserved for specific Congressional action.").
60. See Young V. Community Nutrition Inst., 476. U.S. 974, 983 (1986) ("This
failure to change the scheme under which the FDA operated is significant, for a
congressional failure to revise Or repeal the agency's interpretation is persuasive
evidence that the interpretation is the one intended by Congress." (internal quotation
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Moreover, Congress has enacted several statutes restricting
tobacco product labeling and advertising without ever suggesting
any role for the Agency.
In 1964, the Federal Trade Commission promulgated a
stringent regulation to control the advertising of tobacco prod
ucts and to require that cigarette packages and all other tobacco
advertising include a warning statement.61 Within a year, Con
gress responded by enacting the Federal Cigarette Labeling and
Advertising Act. 62 The Act was more moderate than the FTC's
regulation, which it superseded; for example, Congress required
that cigarette packages be labeled with a far less ominous state
ment "Caution: Cigarette Smoking May Be Hazardous to Your
Health."63 In its accompanying declaration of purpose, Congress
explained that it sought "to establish a comprehensive Federal

marks omitted»; United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 554 n.10 (1979) ("[O]nce
an agency's statutory construction has been fully brought to the attention of the
public and the Congress, and the latter has not sought to alter that interpretation
although it has amended the statute in other respects, then presumably the legisla
tive intent has been correctly discerned." (internal quotation marks omitted»; Flood
v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 283 (1972) ("Remedial· legislation has been introduced repeat
edly in Congress but none has ever been enacted. . • . This, obviously, has been
deemed to be something other than mere congressional silence and passivity."); cf.
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 241-52 (1994)
(evaluating rationales for divining intent from legislative inaction). The FDA does
not, of course, accept this argument as compelling. See 61 Fed. Reg. 44,619, 45,255
61,' 45,267 (1996) (jurisdictional statement).
61. 29 Fed. Reg. 8324, 8325 (1964) (The required warning label would state
"that cigarette smoking is dangerous to health and may cause death from cancer
and other diseases."); see also 34 Fed. Reg. 7917 (1969) (discussing 1964 regulation);
111 CONG: REC. 13,900, 13,901 (1965) (statement of Sen. Moss) (discussing state
initiatives). For a fuller discussion of the health risks associated with smoking and
the history of the anti-smoking movement, see Matthew Baldini, Comment, The
Cigarette Battle: Anti·Smoking Proponents Go for the Knockout, 26 SETON HALL L.
REV. 348 (1995).
62. Pub. L. No. 89-92, § 2, 79 Stat. 282 (1965) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1331-1337 (1994». The Act barred any other statements relating to smok
ing and health on any cigarette packages. See ill. § 5(a). Congress determined that
warnings were unnecessary in advertising, hut it noted that the FTC's authority
with respect to false or misleading cigarette 'advertising was unaffected by the Act.
See H.R. REP. No. 89-449, at 4-5 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.AN. 2350, 2353.
The FTC retained its limited authority over tobacco advertising, including authority
to require tar and nicotine content disclosure, but Congress granted it no additional
powers. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1335a(a), 1336 (1994). The provisions barring the FTC from
requiring warnings to accompany cigarette. advertising expired on July 1, 1969. See
§§ 5(c), 10, 79 Stat. at 283·84.
63. § 4, 79 Stat. at 283.
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Program to deal with cigarette labeling and advertising with
respect to any relationship between smoking and health," and to
avoid impeding commer:ce "by diverse, nonuniform, and confus
ing cigarette labeling and advertising regulations."64 Although
geared primarily toward displacing state regulation,65 Congress
also apparently intended to confirm limited regulatory authority
in a single federal agency.66
The original statute made only ambiguous references to the
jurisdiction and authority of the FTC and other federal agencies
over cigarette advertising. In 1967, the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) responded to a citizen complaint about broad
cast cigarette advertising, holding that, under its "f~irness doc
trine," stations which broadcast cigarette advertising have a
duty to inform listeners of the dangers of smoking by airing
public service announcements prepared by interested health
organizations. 67 Shortly thereafter, the FCC proposed to ban
cigarette advertising from radio and television. 68 Similarly, in
1969, the FTC reinstituted its rulemaking proceedings to require
that warnings accompany all cigarette advertising. 69
Once again Congress stepped in, this time to supplant the
FCC's decision70 and to prevent both agencies from finalizing
64. 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994).
65. See 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,544, 44,546 (1996); infra Part III.B.1.
66. The Act precluded the FTC, the FDA, and the Public Health Service from
imposing any additional health warning requirements on the labeling of cigarettes.
See H.R. REP. No. 89-449, at 19-21 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2350,
2365. But see § 10, 79 Stat. at 284 (noting that the termination in 1969 of the
provisions of the Act affecting advertising regulation "shall not be construed as
limiting, expanding, or otherwise affecting the jurisdiction or authority which the
Federal Trade Commission or any other Federal agency had prior to the date of the
enactment of this Act"); Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1089 (D.C. Cir. 1968)
(holding that 1965 cigarette warning statute did hot bar the FCC from requiring
stations to broadcast anti-smoking messages).
67. See Television Station WCBS-TV, 8 F.C.C.2d 381, affd, 9 F.C.C.2d 921
(1967), affd, Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1089-9.0 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
68. See 34 Fed. Reg. 1959 (1969).
69. See 34 Fed. Reg. 7917 (1969) (proposing to require a detailed warning that
"cigarette smoking is dangerous to -health -and may cause death from cancer, coro
nary heart disease, chronic bronchitis, pulmonary emphysema, and other diseases").
70. See S. REP. No. 91-566, at 6-7, 12 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2652, 2657-58, 2663. A similar series of events occurred when the Consumer Product
Safety Commission (CPSC) denied a petition requesting that it assert jurisdiction
over "high tar" cigarettes. A court held that the CPSC did indeed have jurisdiction
over these products. See American Pub. Health Ass'n v. Consumer Prod. Safety
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their proposals.71 Effective January 1, 1971, Congress prohibit
ed ·all broadcast advertising of cigarettes. 72 In addition to its
advertising ban, the 1969 Act required the use of a sterner label
"Warning: The Surgeon General Has Determined That Cigarette
Smoking. Is Dangerous to Your Health."73 In 1984, Congress
again amended the statute, requiring quarterly rotation of four
different, and very specific, warning labels on cigarette packag
es. 74 Thus, over the course of the past three decades, Congress
has micromanaged the cigarette labeling and advertising issue.
Cigarettes are not the only to1;>acco products to have re
ceived close legislative attention. In 1986, Congress enacted the
Comm'n, [1972-1975 Transfer Binder] Consumer Ptod. Safety Guide (CCH) 'lI 75,081
(D.D.C. May 30, 1975), vacated as moot, No. 75-1863 (D.C. Cir. June 15, 1976).
Congress reacted swiftly by eliminating the Commission's jurisdiction over cigarettes.
See Consumer Product Safety Commission Improvements Act, Pub. L. No. 94-284,
§ 3(c), 90 Stat. 503 (1976) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1261(0(2) (1994».
71. Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, § 7(b), 84
Stat. 87, 89 ("Except as provided in subsection (a), nothing in this Act shall be
construed to limit, restrict, expand, or otheryiise affect the authority of the Federal
Trade Commission with respect to unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the
advertising of cigarettes."). Subsectio~ (a) imposed a stay on the FrC rule regarding
cigarette advertising until July 1; 1971. Congress appeared reluctant even to endorse
the FrC's authority in this area, let alone that of any other agency, adding that
"[n]othing in this Act shall be construed to affirm or deny the Federal Trade
Commission's holding that it has the authority to issue trade regulation rules or to
require an affirmative statement in any cigarette advertisement." Id. § 7(c).
72. See id. § 6. Although challenged in court, Congress' broadcast ban was up
held. See Capital Broad. Co. 'To Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971), affd mem.,
405 U.S. 1000 (1972). The district court concluded that the First Amendment rights
of broadcasters were not impaired under the statute, and that broadcasters had lost
only the ability to collect revenues from others for broadcasting their commercial
messages. See id. at 584 ("Finding nothing in the Act or its legislative history which
precludes a broadcast licensee from airing its own point of view on any aspect of
the cigarette smoking question, it is clear that petitioners' speech is not at issue.").
Because substantial evidence demonstrated that radio and television advertising ef
fectively reached a large audience of young people, the court held that Congress had
a rational basis for prohibiting broadcast advertising. See id. at 585-86; see also
infra Part IV (discussing cigarette advertising restrictions under current commercial
speech doctrine).
73. § 4, 84 Stat. at 88.
74. See Comprehensive Smoking Education Act, Pub. L. No. 98-474, § 4(c), 98
Stat. 2200, 2203 (1984) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a) (1994». Similar rotating
warnings were prescribed for cigarette advertisements and billboards. See id.
§ 4(aX2), (3). For a fuller discussion of warning requirements for tobacco and other
consumer products, see Lars Noah, The Imperative to Warn: Disentangling the "Right
to Know" from the 'Weed to Know" About Consumer Product Hazards, 11 YALE J. ON
REG. 293 (1994).
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Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act. 75 Re
sponding to concerns that the use of chewing tobacco may cause
gum disease and mouth cancer/6 Congress adopted warning re
quirements similar to those required for cigarettes. 77 The FTC
wa~ given the responsibility for implementing and enforcing
these requirements. 78 The Act directed the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) to establish a public educa
tion program,79 but Congress never provided funding for any ef
forts to inform consumers about the health hazards associated
with smokeless tobacco products.so
Other federal agencies may, of course, still deal with certain
tobacco-related issues unrelated to warning labels and advertis
ing. For instance, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
(BATF) collects excise taxes and regulates product manufactur
ing. 81 HHS, of which the FDA is a unit, recently promulgated a

75. Pub. L. No. 99-252, 100 Stat. 30 (1986) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4401-4408
(1994».
76. See S. REP. No. 99-209, at 3-4 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.AN. 9-10
(expressing concern that young people were using smokeless tobacco products with
the misimpression that these were safe alternatives to cigarettes).
77. See 15 U.S.C. § 4402(aX1), (cX1) (1994). These same warnings must appear
in any advertising for smokeless tobacco products, enclosed in a special circle-and
arrow graphic design. Id. § 4402(aX2), (bX2XB).
78. See id. §§ 4402(bHd), 4404-4405. The FTC's implementing regulations appear
in 16 C.F.R. § 307 (1996). One aspect of·the FTC's original regulations, exempting
advertisements appearing on utilitarian items (such as tote bags) from the warning
requirements, subsequently was invalidated. See Public Citizen v. FTC, 869 F.2d
1541, 1554-57 (D.C. Cir. 1989); see also 61 Fed. Reg. 45,883 (1996) (finalizing revised
regulations to replace those invalidated by the court). The FDA explains that its
advertising restrictions extend beyond the scope of the FTC's limited authority in
this area. See 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,545 (1996).
79. See 15 U.S.C. § 4401 (1994). A similar provision was added by the 1984
cigarette legislation. See id. § 1341(a). Although HHS apparently has not imple
mented these programs, presumably it would delegate the task to the Public Health
Service, which is responsible for other health education programs, rather than to the
FDA. See 42 C.F.R. § 51g (1996) (regulating grants for health education risk re
duction); see. also 39 FEDERAL YELLOW BOOK 11-240 (1996) (listing the "Office on
Smoking and Health" in HHS's National Center for Chronic Disease Prevention and
Health Promotion).
80. Jeffrey Denny, Snuffs Tough Stuff; How the Smokeless Tobacco Industry
Plays I~ Deadly Trade, WASH. POST, May 16, 1993, at C5.
81. See 27 C.F.R. § 270 (1996). BATF "has no authority over the safety and
labeling aspects of tobacco products with respect to consumer product safety." Letter
from Daniel R. Black, Deputy Assoc. Dir., BATF, to James T. O'Reilly (Oct. 12,
1988), cited in O'Reilly, supra note 56, at 226 nA8.
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rule requiring all states to maintain and enforce laws prohibit
ing the sale of tobacco products to persons under the age of eigh
teen as a condition of receivi,ng block grants controlled by the
Department.82 HHS also must transmit reports to Congress
concerning research on the addictiveness of tobacco products and
any recommendations for legislative or administrative action.83
Other federal agencies recently have become interested in the
regulation of environmental tobacco smoke.84
Even so, the history of federal legislation addressing ciga
rette labeling and advertising suggests a congressional decision
against delegating its legislative authority to any federal agency
though reserving some of the FTC's existing authority over ad
vertising as applied to tobacco products and directing it to imple
ment the smokeless tobacco controls~ The failure to address the
FDA's role is notable but hardly surprising given the Agency's
own prior view that it lacked anything other than a limited
authority to regulate tobacco products under the FD&C Act.
Congressional silence undermines rather than buttresses the
FDA's current attempt to restrict the advertising and distribu
tion of cigarettes and smokeless tobacco products.

B. Tobacco Products as Medical Devices
Even assuming that the nicotine in tobacco products falls
within the FDA's authority over drugs, the treatment of such
products as medical devices seems tenuous. The Agency ac
knowledges that regulating cigarettes and other tobacco prod
82. See 61 Fed. Reg. 1492 (1996) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 96.122-.130)
(requiring that states engage in random, unannounced inspections of tobacco product
vendors and maintain minimum compliance levels in order to continue to receive
grants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 300x-26 (1994».
83. See 42 U.S.C. § 290aa-2(b) (1994).
84. In 1994, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) pro
posed standards for indoor air quality, including the control of environmental tobacco
smoke in the workplace. See 59 Fed. Reg. 15,968 (1994) (proposing to ban smoking
in all workplaces except for in designated smoking areas vented directly to the
outdoors). The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) also has addressed the issue
of passive smoking. See, e.g., 57 Fed. Reg. 27,772 (1992); see also Alan B. Horowitz,
Terminating the "Passive" Pciradax: A Proposal for Federal Regulation of Environmen
tal Tobacco Smoke, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 183, 215-19 (1991) (suggesting that the EPA
issue national uniform standards under the Clear Air Act to protect people from
secondhand smoke).
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ucts as drugs would logically result in a ban on such products.85
Under the FD&C Act, approval of a new drug application (NDA)
requires that a drug product be proven "safe and effective" for
its intended use. 86 Because of the documented health hazards of
smoking, this NDA requirement would pose a serious obstacle
for the future marketing of tobacco products as drugs.
Even if this premarket approval hurdle could somehow be
surmounted,87 the FDA would have to require that cigarettes be
available only on a doctor's prescription, at least if it wanted to
control their advertising.86 Instead, the Agency has opted to
take a different and more dubious regulatory tack. As explained
in the next section, the new rules would regulate tobacco prod
ucts as medical devices,89 specifically as "restricted" medical de

85. See 60 Fed. Reg. 41,314, 41,348 (1995) ("The products would be unapproved
new drugs, ~d as such, FDA could' require their removal from the market."); see
also 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(d), 355(a) (1994) (prohibiting the sale of unapproved new
drugs); Public Health Cigarette Amendments of 1971: Hearings Before the Consumer
Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 92d Congo 239 (1972)
(statement of Charles C. Edwards, Commissioner of Food and Drugs) ("[I]f cigarettes
were to be classified as drugs, they would have to be removed from the market
because it would be impossible to prove they were safe for their intended us[e]."); id.
at 242 ("[L]abeling or banning cigarettes is a step that can be take[n] only by the
Congress. Any such move by FDA would be inconsistent with the clear congressional
intent."). The Agency also asserts that banning- tobacco products would not be the
most effective means of protecting the public health-it fears that the highly addic
tive nature' of nicotine may mean adverse health consequences for smokers as a
consequence of inadequate treatment for Withdrawal and poor-quality black market
cigarettes. See 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,398, 44,413 (1996).
86. See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (1994); 21 C.F.R. pt. 314 (1996). The Act defines "new
drug" as any drug "the composition of which is such that such drug is not generally
recognized, among experts qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate
the safety and effectiveness of drugs, as safe and effective for use under the condi
tions prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling thereof." 21 U.S.C.
§ 321(pXl). For a summary of some of the most important requirements, see Lars
Noah, Sham Petitioning as a Threat to the Integrity of the Regulatory Process, 74
N.C. L. REV. I, 6-10 (1995).
87. See infra notes 158-160 and accompanying text (discussing possible exemp
tions from new drug requirements).

88. See 21 U.S.C. § 352(n) (granting the FDA authority to regulate the advertis
ing of prescription drugs); id. § 353(b) (requiring prescription status for drugs which
are -habit-forming or are not safe for use except under the supervision of physicians
because of their toxicity or potentiality for harmful effect).
89. The statute defines a medical device as follows:
[A]n instrument, apparatus, . . . or other similar- or related article . . . which
is . . . (2) intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other condition, or in
the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, in man or other ani
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vices,90 so that the FDA can exert control over their advertising
as well as their distribution and use. 91
The FDA asserts that cigarettes and smokeless tobacco
products are combination drug-device products which it has the
discretion to regulate as medical devices.92 The Agency explains
this categorization by claiming first that tobacco products, be
cause they consist of nicotine (a drug) and other components,93
are combination products which together function as drug-deliv
ery systems. 94 The FDA then lists other examples of so-called
mals, or (3) intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of
man or other animals, and which does not achieve any of its principal intend
ed purposes through chemical action within or on the body of man or other
animals and which is not dependent upon being metabolized for the
achievement of its principal intended purposes.
Id. § 321(h); see also Gary E. Gamerman, Note, Intended Use and Medical Devices:
Distinguishing Nonmedical "Devices· from Medical "Devices· Under 21 U.S.C.
§ 321(h), 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 806 (1993).
90. 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,405. Pursuant to the Act, the restricted device designa
tion is appropriate if, because of a device's "potentiality for harmful effect or the
collateral measures necessary to its use, the Secretary determines that there cannot
otherwise be reasonable assurance of its safety and effectiveness." 21 U.S.C.
§ 360j(eXIXB) (1994); see also 21 C.F.R. § 807.3(i) (1996) (defining restricted devices
as those for which the FDA has "restricted sale, distribution, or use only upon the
written or oral authorization of a practitioner licensed by law to administer or use
the device or upon such other conditions as the Commissioner may prescribe"); infra
Part II.C.
91. Congress has, in general, assigned to the Fl'C the duty to oversee product
advertising, including the advertising of tobacco products. See supra Part II.A.2.
Under the FD&C Act, the FDA has advertising authority only over prescription
drugs and "restricted" medical devices. See 21 U.S.C. § 352(n), (q) (1994).
92. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,403 (observing that "the device provisions offer FDA
more flexibility"); id. at 44,414-16 (suggesting that it could have imposed many of
the same restrictions by issuing regulations pursuant to its authority over drug
products); see also 21 C.F.R. § 3.2(eXl) (1996) (defining a combination product as a
"product comprised of two or more regulated components, i.e., drug/device").
93. See 61 Fed. Reg. 44,619, 45,206-07 (1996) (jurisdictional statement). In the
case of cigarettes, the FDA asserts that the
primary purpose of the parts of the cigarette ... is to effectuate the delivery
of a carefully controlled amount of nicotine to a site in the human body where
it can be absorbed...• The delivery system, the nicotine-containing cigarette,
must be lit to have its intended effect on the structure or function of the
body, and, once lit and used, is discarded.
Id. (quoting NPRM). Smokeless tobacco products, the Agency explains, "function like
infusion devices or transdermal patches that deliver continuous amounts of nicotine
to the cheek tissue for absorption into the bloodstream. The device element of
smokeless products is the tobacco, which contains the nicotine but is not intended to
be consumed." Id.; see also id. at 45,213-16.
94. See id. at 45,208-18; 60 Fed. Reg. 41,314, 41,347 (1995) ("FDA considers
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"pre-filled delivery systems," such as transdermal patches, pre
filled syringes, and metered-dose inhalers (MDIs), which it as
serts are comparable to tobacco products in function.95 Finally,
although it acknowledges that its Center for Drug Evaluation
and Research (CDER) has primary jurisdiction over such combi
nation products because they represent dedicated rather than
generic delivery systems, the Agency asserts that it nonetheless
may exercise its discretion to regulate tobacco products as medi
cal devices. 96 Ignoring their primary mode of action as a drug,
the FDA argues that CDER's undoubted jurisdiction over pre
filled drug-delivery systems does not necessarily dictate which
provisions of the FD&C Act should apply to tobacco products.97
Although the Agency certainly may select from among the
available statutory provisions those most suited to its particular
regulatory goal, this discretionary power is limited by the terms
of the statutory provisions themselves. For a number of reasons,
the FDA cannot logically treat tobacco products as medical de
vices, let alone "restricted" devices. For instance, in order to
sustain its drug-delivery system argument, the Agency must
acknowledge and distinguish relevant regulatory precedents.
The FDA has required that smoking deterrent products such as
transdermal nicotine patches and nicotine chewing gum, which
are virtually indistinguishable from cigarettes in their function

articles . . . whose primary purpose is the delivery of a drug, and that are distribut
ed with a drug product to be drug delivery systems."); see also Anita Manning, AMA
Calls for Tobacco Regulation, USA TODAY, June 8, 1994, at 1A (The AMA labeled
nicotine "the most addictive drug we know . . . . Cigarettes are no different than
syringes. They are a drug delivery device. . . . They should be regulated as we
regulate morphine and heroin."). In reaching its conclusion, the FDA purports to rely
on the Intercenter Agreement Between the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research
(CDER) and the Center for Devices and Radiological Health (CDRH), § VII(AX1Xb)
(Oct. 31, 1991) (hereinafter the "Intercenter Agreement"); see 61 Fed. Reg. at 45,211.
95. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 45,206, 45,211; 60 Fed. Reg. at 41,521. In the preamble
accompanying the final regulations, the FDA also lists catheter flush solution and in
travenous infusion pumps pre-filled with a simple diluent as combination products it
has regulated as devices.
96. See 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,403 (1996).
97. See id. at 44,400-03 (claiming that the FDA has the authority to regulate
tobacco products under either the drug or medical device provisions of the Act, or
both, as it deems appropriate); see also 21 C.F.R. § 3.1 (1996) (stating that
"[n]othing in this section prevents FDA from using any agency resources it deems
necessary to ensure adequate review of the safety and effectiveness of any product,
or the substantial equivalence of any device to a predicate device").
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and intended effect, satisfy NDA requirements prior to market
ing. 98 With regard to these products, the Agency chose not to
categorize either product as a medical device. Indeed, the FDA
has classified all smoking deterrent products as drugs. 99
In addition, the FD&C Act was amended in 1990 to require
that a product be regulated according to its "primary mode of ac
tion. "100 For example, ordinary empty syri~ges are regulated as
medical devices, while pre-filled syringes are regulated as drugs.
Under this rationale, dedicated drug-delivery devices clearly
ought to be regarded as drug products, not medical devices. As
the FDA itself notes, the 1991 Intercenter Agreement between
CDER and the Center for Devices and Radiological Health
(CDRH) supports this conclusion,lOl but it nonetheless believes
that cigarettes and smokeless tobacco products should be regu
lated as medical devices. 102 In the past, the FDA successfully
has used counterintuitive classifications of products in order to
maximize its regulatory control, but these efforts almost always

98. The NDA for Nicorette, a prescription drug chewing gum product containing
2 mg. of nicotine per piece, was approved in 1984; the product is indicated "as a
temporary aid to the cigarette smoker seeking to give up his or her smoking habit
while· participating in a behavior modification program under medical or dental
supervision." 49 PHYsICIANS' DESK REFERENCE 2346 (1995); see also Nicotine Nasal
Spray Aims to Halt Smoking, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1996, at C7 ("The nicotine nasal
spray • . . reaches the bloodstream faster than the nicotine in the gum or patch,
offering the potential of almost immediate relief of cigarette cravings.").
99. See 58 Fed. Reg. 31,236 (1993). The final rule establishes that any smoking
deterrent product for over-the-counter (OTC) .use is not generally recognized as safe
and effective and is misbranded. See 21 C.F.R. § 310.544. Any such nonprescription
products containing active ingredients are new drugs and require a new drug appli
cation or an abbreviated new drug application. See ill. The FDA recently approved
OTC sale of Nicorette gum and the Nicotrol patch. See Amal K. Naj, J&J Nicotine
Patch Is Cleared for Sale Over the Counter, WAIJ.. ST. J., July 5, 1996, at B10; John
Schwartz, FDA Approves Nicorette Sales, WASH. POST, Feb. 10, 1996, at A7.
100. Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-629, § 16(a), 104 Stat.
4511, 4526 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 353 (1994» (requiring the develop
ment of intercenter agreements to regulate products that constitute a combination of
a drug, device, or biologic); 21 C.F.R. § 3.4 (summarizing lntercenter Agreements).
101. See M-D-D-I REPORTS ("The Gray Sheet"), Nov. 25, 1991, at 6-11 (Under the
lntercenter Agreement, a "device containing a drug substance as a component with
the primary purpose of the combination product being to fulfill a drug purpose is a
combination product and will be regulated as a drug by CDER.").
102. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,402-03. Despite its decision to regulate cigarettes as
medical devices, the FDA appears to assign all tobacco products ~ its drug center;
for instance, it requires that certain labeling and advertising be forwarded to CDER.
See 21 C.F.R. § 897.30(aX2).
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involved treating medical devices and other products as
drugs. 103 Here, for perhaps the fIrst time, the FDA is playing
this semantic game in reverse, trying to force an apparent drug
product into the less exacting medical device category.104
By reversing its position on the proper classifIcation of dedi
cated drug-delivery systems, at least in the treatment of tobacco
products as medical devices, the FDA sets a dubious precedent
for other products. At present, for instance, the Agency regards
MDI actuators and infusion pumps as drug-delivery systems
within CDER's jurisdiction. 105 If the tobacco regulations reflect
a revised FDA interpretation of the statute, MDI actuators and
other such articles could be recharacterized as medical devices
subject to less stringent controls. (Of course, the FDA could re

103. The FDA has used the. broad statutory definition of "drug" on numerous
occasions to regulate products that otherwise would have been subject to the less
stringent food, device, or cosmetic provisi!lns of the Act. See, e.g., United States v.
An Article of Drug . . . Bacto·Unidisk, 394 U.S. 784, 799 (1969) (holding that, in
view of the statutory purpose, "it was entirely reasonable for the Secretary to
determine that the discs, like the antibiotics they serve, are drugs and similarly sub·
ject to pre-clearance certification"); A14P Inc. v. Gardner, 389 F.2d 825, 826 (2d Cir.
1968) (upholding the F~A's categorization of a nylon vessel clamp (ligature) as a
drug rather than a device); cf. National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Mathews, 557
F.2d 325, 329 (2d Cir. 1977) (rejecting an FDA attempt to regulate high potency
vitamins as drugs); United States v. Article ... OVA II, 414 F. Supp. 660, 661-65
(D.N.J. 1975) (rejecting an FDA attempt to categorize a home pregnancy kit as a
drug), affd, 535 F.2d 1248 (3d Cir. 1976). The FDA also has declared that all
intrauterine devices (IUDs) which incorporate heavy metals or other chemicals for
contraceptive purposes were "new drugs" within the meaning of the FD&C Act. See
21 C.F.R. § 310.502(a); 38 Fed. Reg. 6137 (1973).
104. The Agency has, on occasion, asserted device status for products that argu
ably are completely beyond its jurisdiction. See, e.g., United States v. Undetermined
Number of Unlabeled Cases, 21 F.3d 1026, 1028-29 (10th Cir. 1994) (in vitro diag
nostic specimen collection containers used for insurance underwriting purposes);
United States v. 25 Cases ... "Sensor Pad," 942 F.2d 1179, 1182 (7th Cir. 1991)
(self-examination devices to help detect breast cancer); United States v. 23, More or
Less, Articles, 192 F.2d 308, 310 (2d Cir. 1951) (self-help phonograph records);
United States v. 22 Rectangular . . . MD-200, 714 F. Supp. 1159, 1164 (D. Utah
1989) (sterilizer machine for s:urgical instruments).
105. At present, FDA-regulated firms must clear drug-delivery systems through
CDER. See, e.g., M-D-D-I REPORTS ("The Gray. Sheet"), Nov. 28, 1994, at 6-7 (de
scribing a California company which was developing a new aerosol cartridge delivery
system for use with a variety of drugs and planned to file an investigational new
drug application before beginning clinical trials); M-D-D-I REPORTS ("The Gray
Sheet"), Apr. 4, 1994, at I&W-10 (quoting CDRH official as advising device manufac
turers that "[m]any drug delivery systems have been on hold" because of questions
about cross-labeling of the devices and the drugs that they deliver).
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spond that tobacco products ar.e sui generis, a case to be treated
separately from other drug-delivery systems and that, in the
future, it will deal with other such products on. a case-by-case
basis.) There are important differences in the rigor of the ap
proval and in the oversight processes between the "drug" and
"device" categories. 106 Certain combination products are, for
safety reasons, better treated as drugs than as devices. Argu
ably, products such as transdermal patches and syringes pre
filled with biologics genuinely require the more stringent con
trols that accompany a "drug" designation.
C. Tobacco Products as "Restricted" Medical Devices

The FDA next asserts that cigarettes and smokeless tobacco
products are not only medical devices, but are also properly
characterized and regulated as "restricted" medical devices. The
FD&C Act authorizes the Secretary to promulgate regulations
restricting a device's "sale, distribution, or use ... if, because of
its potentiality for harmful effect or the collateral measures
necessary to its use, the Secretary determines that there cannot
otherwise be reasonable assurance of its safety and effective
ness."107 The Agency asserts that all of its restrictions on dis
tribution and advertising are necessary to reduce tobacco
products' potentiality for harmful effect. lOS
The regulations c.ontain a number of provisions aimed at
substantially reducing the sale and distribution of tobacco prod
ucts to minors. The FDA will require, among other things., that

106. See, e.g., Peter Barton. Hutt et al., The Standard of Evidence Required for
Premarket Approval Under the Medical Device Amendments of 1976, 47 FOOD &
DRUG L.J. 605 (1992); Robert B. Leflar, Public Accountability and Medical Device
Regulation, 2 lIARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (1989); Lawrence S. Makow, Note, Medical De
vice Review at the Food and Drug Administration: Lessons from Magnetic Resonance
Spectroscopy and Biliary Lithotripsy, 46 STAN. L. REV. 709 (1994).
107. 21 U.S.C. § 360j(eX1X~) (1994).
108. See 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,405 (1996) ("The agency has determined that
unless measures are taken now to prohibit the sale and promotion of [tobacco]
products to young people under the age of 18, there cannot otherwise be reasonable
assurance of safety."). The FDA argues, for example, that the photographic identifica
tion requirements are necessary to prevent sales to those under the age of 18. See
id. at 44,439-40; see also id. at 44,444 (explaining the necessity for a prohibition on
the use of nontobacco product names).
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retailers verify the age of purchasers by demanding picture
identification;l09 prohibit vending-machine sales in certain 10
cations;l1O and prohibit the distribution of free samples of both
cigarettes and smokeless tobacco pro ducts. 111 The FDA may
have difficulty justifying its point-of-sale restrictions under its
authority to limit the distribution of restricted devices. The
reach of the statute may not be as great as the Agency would
like, but regulations governing vending-machine sales, photo
identification restrictions, and the like may be better left to
state control. 112
For most medical devices, the FTC has advertising authority
pursuant to the FTC Act, which prohibits false or deceptive
advertising. 113 In 1976, Congress gave the FDA limited author
ity to regulate the advertising of restricted medical devices. 114

109. See 21 C.F.R. § 897.14(bX1).
110. See id. § 897.14(c).
111. See id. § 897.16(aX2Xi). The FDA originally had proposed banning mail-order
sales, but it decided to drop this restriction as unnecessary. See 61 Fed. Reg. at
44,458-59. A number of small tobacco retailers maintain sales sites on the "World
Wide Web" through which they market lesser-known cigarette brands in the United
States and abroad. Many of these retailers make no attempt to verify the age of
their customers or to include the required Surgeon General's Warning on their
Internet sites. See Timothy Noah, Cigarettes Are Being Marketed Through Web Sites
on the Internet, WALL ST. J., Jan. 24, 1996, at B2; see also 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,501
02 (discussing promotional questions posed by the use of the Internet).
112. All 50 states currently ban the sale of tobacco products to children under
the age of 18, but enforcement of the state statutes has been notoriously lax. See
Barnaby J. Feder, A Study Finds that Teen-Ag~rs Are Buying Cigarettes with Ease,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1996, at A10 (According to a recent government survey, the
percentage of teenage smokers between the ages of 12 and 17 who have successfully
purchased their own cigarettes rose from 58% in 1989 to 62% in 1993.). HHS
recently promulgated a final rule requiring all states to maintain and enforce laws
prohibiting the sale of tobacco products to persons under the age of 18 as a con
dition for continuing to receive federal block grants. See 61 Fed. Reg. 1492 (1996) (to
be codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 96.122-.130) (requiring random, unannounced state
inspections of tobacco product vendors and demanding that states maintain minimum
compliance levels in order to continue to receive grants).
113. See 15 U.S.C. § 52 (1994); see also Removatron Int'l Corp. v. FTC, 884 F.2d
1489, 1498 (1st Cir. 1989) (upholding an FTC order requiring that an advertising
claim for a device promising permanent removal of unwanted hair be supported by
at least one well-controlled scientific study).
114. See Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, § 3(eX1), 90
Stat. 539, 577-78 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 352(q), (r) (1994». This power and others
apply only to those restricted devices identified as such by the FDA through the
issuance of regulations under § 520(e) of the FD&C Act. See 21 U.S.C. § 360j(e)
(1994). Other special provisions applicable to restricted devices require the sub mis
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Fourteen years earlier, the Agency had acquired advertising
jurisdiction over prescription drug pro ducts. lIS It is not clear
why Congress chose to specify "restricted" rather than "prescrip
tion" devices, though the .available legislative history suggests
that these terms were viewed as synonymous. 1I6
The FDA's implementation of this authority over the last
two decades has only contributed to the confusion about its
meaning. Initially, the Agency announced that all existing pre
scription devices would be regarded as restricted medical devic
es.1l7 Although invalidated on procedural grounds,1I8 this con
temporaneous interpretation of the statute-equating "restrict
ed" with prescription-deserves some judicial deference. 1l9
The FDA never promulgated general regulations to imple

sion of all labeling and sllll.lples of advertising, see id. § 360QX1XBXi), and authorize
broader FDA factory inspections, see id. § 374(a); see also id. §§ 360d(aX2XBXv),
360e(dX1XBXii) (providing that perfonnance standards and premarket approval
requirements must take account of any 8pecial device restrictions).
115. See Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 131(a), 76 Stat. 780,
791-92 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 352(n) (1994»; see also Lars Noah, Death of a Sales
man: To What Extent Can the FDA Regulate the Promotional Statements of Pharma
ceutical Sales Representatives?, 47 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 309, 322-26 (1992). The FrC is
responsible for regulating the advertising of nonprescription drug products. See 36
Fed. Reg. 18,539 (1971) (announcing a memorandum of understanding between the
FDA and the FrC).
116. See H.R. REp. No. 94-853, at 25 (1976) ("In addition to authorizing the
Secretary to limit a device to prescription status, conditions on sale or distribution
could include use only within hospitals or clinics. . . . Also, . . . certain devices
which would not be appropriate for use by the ordinary layman could be authorized
for use by trained nurses and technicians." (emphasis added»; S. 510, 94th Congo
§§ 707, 708(a) (1975) (this earlier version of the legislation referred only to "prescrip
tion devices"), reprinted in 121 CONGo REC. 10701 (1975). The FDA asserts that the
restricted device provision, though a "counterpart" to the prescription drug adver
tising provision, "is significantly broader." See 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,405.
117. See 41 Fed. Reg. 22,620, 22,621 (1976) ("Restricted devices include all
prescription devices as now defined in 21 C.F.R. § 801.109 . . . ."). This cross-refer
ence remains in the regulations. See 21 C.F.R. § 807.3(i) (1996).
118. See In re Establishment Inspection Portex, Inc., 595 F.2d 84, 86 (1st Cir.
1979); Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. FDA, 589 F.2d 1175, 1181 (2d Cir. 1978). Both
cases involved the FDA's broader factory inspection authority over restricted devices.
See 21 U.S.C. ~ 374(a).
119. See, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 142 (1976); NLRB v.
Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 274-75 (1974); Les v. Reilly, 968 F.2d 985, 989
(9th Cir. 1992); Rhodia, Inc. v. FDA, 608 F.2d 1376, 1379 (D.C. Cir. 1979); United
States v. Undetennined Quantities ... Exachol, 716 F. Supp. 787, 795 (S.D.N.Y.
1989); cf. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 187 (1991) (deferring to revised interpreta
tion of statute where supported by "reasoned analysis").
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ment its authority over restricted medical devices. In 1980, it
issued a proposed regulation,120 but this was withdrawn the
following year. 121 In recent years the Agency has repeatedly
announced its plans to issue a rulemaking proposal on this is
sue,l22 but the FDA withdrew this promise just one week after
the issuance of the proposed tobacco regulations. 123
The FDA has successfully asserted its restricted device
authority on only one occasion; when it promulgated special
rules for the labeling and distribution of hearing aids in
1977.124 The legal basis for this decision is hardly obvious. l25
The preamble to the final regulation cited the restricted device
120. See 45 Fed. Reg. 65,619, 65,624 (1980) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 899.60)
(proposed Oct. 3, 1980) (defining the advertising limitation on restricted devices in
its entirety as follows: "Any advertisement for a restricted device may not recom
mend or imply any use that is not in the labeling for the restricted device.").
121. See 46 Fed. Reg. 57,569 (1981). In explaining its withdrawal of the proposal,
the Agency cited comments that the proposed regulations were overly burdensome
and that the FDA had exceeded its authority under § 520(e) of the FD&C Act. See
id.
122. See, e.g., 60 Fed. Reg. 23,304, 23,310 (1995) (Semi-annual Unified Regulatory
Agenda) ("FDA would propose to include in this [restricted] category devices such as
those that pierce or penetrate the skin, implantable devices, devices that introduce
medicinal gas or energy into the body and devices that are used for diagnosis that
must be interpreted or analyzed by a qualified health professiona!."). Publication of
such a notice of proposed rulemaking was anticipated sometime during September of
1995. See id. Earlier timetables suggested a proposal by May of 1994. See 59 Fed.
Reg. 20,355, 20,356 (1994).
123. See 60 Fed. Reg. 60,033 (1995) (noting that the plan was withdrawn on
Aug. 16, 1995).
124. See 42 Fed. Reg. 9286, 9293-94 (1977) (codified as amended at 21 C.F.R.
§§ 801.420-.421 (1996». The regulations do not explicitly characterize hearing aids as
restricted devices. See id.; see also 21 C.F.R. § 874.3300 (1996) (classification regula
tion). Nonetheless, the FDA now refers to its regulation of this device as precedent
for its use of the restricted device provisions of the statute. See 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396,
44,406, 44,408 (1996).
125. The regulations were challenged unsuccessfully. See 42 Fed. Reg. 40,215
(1977) (agreeing to a stay of the effective date pending the outcome of this litiga
tion); New Jersey Guild of Hearing Aid Dispensers v. Long, 384 A.2d 795, 801 n.2
(N.J: 1978) (noting that the district court had upheld the regulations). Manufacturers
have attempted to rely on the FDA's assertion of jurisdiction as a basis for cliaUeng
ing the FTC's continued supervision of their advertising. See In re Dahlberg, 1995
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19697, at *13-*15 (D. Minn. Mar. 31, 1995) (rejecting this argu
ment). Similarly, companies have argued that the FDA's regulations preempt contin
ued state supervision. See Kievlan v. Dahlberg Elecs., 144 Cal. Rptr. 585, 590 (App.
1978) (concluding that the FDA had not in tact classified hearing aids as restricted
devices); see also Massachusetts v. Hayes, 691 F.2d 57, 60-64 (1st Cir. 1982); Smith
V. Pingree, 651 F.2d 1021, 1023-25 (5th Cir. 1981).
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prOVISIon as statutory authority for the regulations, but the
proposal never did so because its publication pre-dated passage
of the MDA by one month. l26 Moreover, the final rules pre-dat
ed the successful judicial challenges to the Agency's policy of
treating all prescription devices as restricted medical devic
es. 127 Finaliy, to the extent that this regulation serves as any
meaningful guidance for the restricted device provision, it again
reflects an assumption that the term "restricted" refers only to
those medical devices whose distribution has been limited to
prescription or professional sale. The FDA has not, however,
restricted access to tobacco products in any such fashion.
Thus, after twenty years of disuse, the FDA suddenly and
creatively seizes upon its restricted device authority as a con
venient basis for controlling the advertising of tobacco products;
products which heretofore have never been regarded as medical
devices, much less restricted devices. Putting hearing aids to one
side, the Agency has not assumed control over the advertising of
any of the other thousands of classes of medical devices current
lyon the market. l28 This is not a case. of creatively squeezing a
nondevice product into an existing medical device pigeonhole. In
stead, the FDA is effectively rediscovering a narrow statutory
category solely to control a nondevice product. Ironically, once

126. See 41 Fed. Reg. 16,756, 16,758 (1976) (though anticipating the use of its
restricted device authority under the then·pending legislation); see also 21 U.S.C.
§ 360j(e) (1994) (specifying requirements for NPRMs under the restricted device
provision); In re Establishment Inspection Portex, Inc., 595 F.2d 84, 86 (1st Cir.
1979) ("Comment on the prescription device regulation obviously would not have
been addressed to the additional strictures imposed on the industry by the 1976
amendment."); Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. FDA, 589 F.2d 1175, 1181 (2d Cir. 1978)
("Congress was careful to provide a rulemaking procedure in which all participants
would have a full opportunity to present their views and analyses of the data
underlying the proposed regulation.");' cf. Chocolate Mfrs. Ass'n v. Block, 755 F.2d
1098, 1104·07 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding that, unless the final regulations are a
"logical outgrowth" of the original proposal, the Administrative Procedure Act reo
quires publication of a revised NPRM to allow for additional comments).
127. See supra note 118. In the context of more recent proposals, the FDA did
not once characterize hearing aids as "restricted" devices. See 58 Fed. Reg. 59,695,
59,696 (1993) (announcing plans to propose revisions to the current distribution and
labeljng regulations).
128. See Sandra J.P. Dennis, Promotion of Devices: An Extension of FDA Drug
Regulation or a New Frontier?, 48 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 87, 93·94 (1993); Ronald M.
Johnson, FDA RegUlatory Actions and Future Plans for Medical Device Promotion
and Advertising, 47 FOOD & DRUG. L.J. 291, 292 (1992).
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the FDA asserts its restricted device authority to regulate adver
tising, the FTC-the one agency that Congress understood as
having the authority to regulate the advertising of tobacco prod
ucts-automatically loses its general jurisdiction over those
products. 129

D. FDA Authority to Regulate Advertising
ofRestricted Devices
The new regulations prohibit the placement of outdoor ad
vertising for tobacco products, including billboards and posters,
within 1,000 feet of any playground or school,l30 and they limit
all tobacco product advertising in publications with an under
eighteen-year-old target audience to black print on a white back
ground only, sometimes characterized as a "text only" or "tomb
stone" format. 13l The regulations also prohibit the marketing,
distribution, sale, or gift of any items, other than the tobacco
products themselves, bearing the product name, logo, selling
message or other "indicia of product identification," and they
prevent tobacco product manufacturers, distributors, and retail
ers from sponsoring any sporting, musical or other social events
using brand-names or other identifying information. 132
The FDA's power to regulate the advertising of restricted
devices is not unlimited. The scant legislative history of the
restricted device provision suggests that Congress meant to give
the FDA advertising authority. over restricted devices that was
co-extensive with its authority over prescription drugs. l33 But
129. See 21 U.S.C. § 352(r) ("[N]o advertisement of a restricted device, published
after the effective date of this paragraph shall, with respect to the matters specified
in this paragraph or covered by regulations issued hereunder, be subject to the
provisions of [the FTC Act,] sections 52 through 55 of title 15."). The FTC would,
however, retain its more specific authority over, for instance, smokeless tobacco
products because it derives from a statute other than the FTCA. See supra note 54.
. 130. See 21 C.F.R. § 897.30(b).
131. See id. § 897.32(a). This restriction applies when minors account for either
15% of a publication's readership or two miIlion readers of a publication.
132. See id. § 897.34. The regulations would, however, permit such events to be
sponsored in the name of the corporation which manufactures the products, provided
that the corporate name had been registered before January 1, 1995. See id.
§ 897.34(c).
133. See S. REP. No. 94-33, at 17 (1975); see also 45 Fed. Reg. 65,619, 65,624
(1980) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 899.60) (proposed Oct. 3, 1980) (defining the
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the Agency has imposed far more intrusive restrictions on tobac
co product advertising than are permissible in the realm of pre
scription drugs. For example, the use of prescription brand
names on reminder advertisements to doctors currently is per
missible;l34 yet the FDA will eradicate the use of tobacco
product brand-names on any item other than the products them
selves. l35
The restrictions on the format and content of print adver
tisements raise similar questions. The Agency again relies on
the broad language of the statute's restricted device provisions
to support these limitations, noting that the FDA enjoys the
power to control the advertising of such products. l3G But the
FDA has never attempted to impose restrictions of this sort on
prescription drugs or restricted devices, and the Agency probably
would not succeed if it tried. l37
The proposals would have required that tobacco product
manufacturers annually spend $150 million on a national educa
tional campaign to discourage minors from using cigarettes and
smokeless tobacco. l38 The final regulations do not include such
a requirement, but the Agency clearly expressed its intention of
separately requiring that companies engage in an educational
campaign.l39
advertising limitation on restricted devices in its entirety as follows: "Any advertise
ment for a restricted device may not recommend or imply any use that is not in the
labeling for the restricted device."), withdrawn, 46 Fed. Reg. 57,569 (1981). In fact,
the FDA's authority over restricted device advertising actually may be somewhat less
extensive than its existing authority over prescription drugs. See Dennis, supra note
128, at 94. But cf. 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,407-08 (1996) (claiming greater authority
over restricted devices); id. at 44,415 (arguing that its authority to regulate drug
advertising is extensive).
. 134. See 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(eX2Xi) (1996).
135. See 21 C.F.R. § 897.34.
136. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,406-07 ("The effectiveness of the restrictions on youth
access would be substantially diminished if the manufacturers were free to entice
children and adolescents to circumvent the access restrictions.").
137. Courts have remanded overbroad FDA injunctions against promotional
activities by drug manufacturers. See, e.g., United States v. Vitasafe Corp., 345 F.2d
864, 870-71 (3d Cir. 1965).
138. See 60 Fed. Reg. 41,314, 41,326-28 (1995) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R.
§ 897.29) (proposed Aug. 11, 1995). Funding among the different manufacturers
would have been in shares proportionate to their total respective advertising and
promotional budgets, and the bulk of this extensive campaign would have to appear
on television.
139. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,538, 44,590; see also Timothy Noah, Clinton's Tobacco
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Even if the restricted medical device categorization properly
applies to tobacco products, it is not at all clear that an indus
try-funded educational campaign would be permissible under the
authority delegated by Congress. In its NPRM, the Agency cited
several provisions of the Act in support of this requirement,140
and it asserted that the various statutory provisions, taken in
combination, would support this remedy.141 The FDA also not
ed that courts have ratified its interpretation of the FD&C Act
as giving it the authority to require dissemination of information
regarding drug products. 142 But the statute expressly forbids

Rule Restricts Ads in Media Deemed Accessible to Minors, WAIL ST. J., Aug. 26,
1996, at B2 ("FDA Commissioner David Kessler said he still anticipates the cam
paign will consist largely of TV ads, and that it will cost between $100 million to
$150 million.").
140. Section 520(e) sets out the FDA's restricted device authority. See 21 U.S.C.
§ 360j(e) (1994); see also supra Part II.C. Sections 502(a) and (q) of the Act provide
that a device and a restricted device, respectively, are misbranded if their labeling is
false or misleading in any particular. See 21 U.S.C. § 352(a), (q). Neither section,
however, specifically authorizes the FDA to require corrective advertising or edu
cational programs to correct misbranding. Section 201(n) of the Act instructs the
Agency, in determining whether labeling or advertising is false or misleading, to
consider "the extent to which the labeling or advertising fails to reveal facts materi
al in the light of such representations or material with respect to consequences
which may result from the use of the article." Id. § 321(n). The Act also contains a
notification provision authorizing the Secretary, upon a determination that a device
presents "an unreasonable risk of substantial harm to public health," to require
notification to health professionals, device users, and others, of the risk involved, see
id. § 360h(aX1).(2), but the Agency did not cite this section in support of its propos
als, though it apparently discovered the potential utility of this provision during the
course of the rulemaking process. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,538.
141. According to the FDA, the proposed campaign
is consistent with these statutory provisions because it is intended to help en
sure that cigarette and smokeless tobacco product advertising and labeling is
not false or misleading and to counteract the appeal of these products previ
ously created by advertising, thereby providing important, material information
regarding the consequences of cigarette or smokeless tobacco product use by
young people.
60 Fed. Reg. 41,314, 41,351 (1995).
142. See id. (citing Pharm. Mfrs. Ass'n v. FDA, 484 F. Supp. 1179, 1183-86 (D.
Del.) (finding statutory authorization in FD&C Act §§ 201(n), 502(a), (0, & 701(a»,
affd, 634 F.2d 106 (3d
1980) (per curiam». In Pharmaceutical Manufacturers,
the drug industry unsuccessfully challenged a proposed regulation requiring that a
patient package insert (PPI) accomllany conjugated estrogen products. The decision
concerned labeling, not advertising. IThe opinion focused on the FDA's authority over
drug product labeling and the requi~ement that labels not be misleading. See Pharm.
Mfrs. Ass'n, 484 F. Supp. at 1185.86. Although the FDA undoubtedly has authority
~, drug ~d ",odioal de""
thi, authority doos ~t .....late into the

Cir.
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prior Agency approval of restricted device advertising. 143
Perhaps in recognition of these weaknesses, the Agency
dropped the educational campaign requirement from the final
regulations. Nonetheless, the FDA announced that, because to
bacco products now are subject to medical device requirements,
it would employ its statutory authority to demand "notification"
of hazards. 144 The notification provision does not, however,
support the FDA's effort to establish an industry-sponsored
public education campaign. Congress authorized the FDA to re
quire notification of users when substantial hazards with a mar
keted device subsequently come to light. 145 In effect, notifica
tion would represent part of a recall strategy, for instance to
advise physicians and patients of potential hazards and the
possible need to replace an implanted device. 146 The FDA's pro
posed educational campaign would not simply advise existing
device users of some newly discovered hazard but instead would
attempt to discourage would-be users.147
A few states currently sponsor public education programs.
In 1988, voters in California approved a tax increase on tobacco
products to finance a state-sponsored anti-smoking media cam
paign.148 With the $150 million raised to date, the program has
significantly reduced the number of smokers in the state. 149
power to demand corrective or educational advertising, particularly when such
remedies are not specifically authorized by the statute.
143. See 21 U.S.C. § 352(r) ("Except in extraordinary circumstances, no regulation
issued under this paragraph [governing restricted devices] shall require prior approv
al by the Secretary of the content of any advertisement . . . .").
144. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,538.
145. See 21 U.S.C. § 360h(a) (authorizing the issuance of an order to notify
health professionals and users if a device "presents an unreasonable risk of substan
tial harm to public health" and if "no more practicable means is available . . • to
eliminate such risk"); 49 Fed. Reg. 11,716 (1984) (announcing the availability of a
draft guideline on Medical Device Notification and Voluntary Safety Alert).
146. As the FDA itself notes, "section 518 of the act [21 U.S.C. § 360h] applies
to the recall of a device, not its advertising." 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,437; cf. 21 U.S.C.
§ 360h(eX1) (authorizing the issuance of a recall order including notification of
health professionals).
147. Elsewhere, in justifying an exemption from a statutory labeling requirement,
the FDA explained that "the public health would not be advanced by requiring
adequate directions for use." See 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,465.
148. See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 30121-30130 (West 1994); Kennedy
Wholesale, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 806 P.2d 1360, 1362-67 (Cal. 1991)
(rejecting challenges to Proposition 99l.
149. See Michael Massing, How to Win the Tobacco War, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, July
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Because the FDA clearly lacks the power to tax cigarettes to
fund its own public education campaign,l50 the Agency must
couch its unprecedented national program as a corrective adver
tising requirement imposed througp. its authority to demand
that device manufacturers notify users of substantial hazards.

*****
More than thirty years ago, the FI'C's cigarette warning
regulation prompted a more moderate legislative response. 151
The FDA may hope to trigger a similar response this time, as it
did unwittingly two decades ago when it attempted to restrict
sales of products sweetened with saccharin. In 1977, the FDA
proposed prohibiting nearly all uses of saccharin because of a
reported association with bladder cancer in animal studies. 152
Congress intervened in the rulemaking process by placing a
moratorium on the Agency's proposed rule and requiring instead
that food products containing saccharin include a warning la
11, 1996, at 32, 36 ("This drive has had remarkable results. Californians have quit
smoking at more than twice the national rate . . . . The rate of smoking among
twelve- to seventeen-year-olds has not fallen as quickly, but, at nearly 11 percent, it
is still roughly half that for the nation as a whole."); see also Bob Hohler, U.S.
Examines State's Youth Tobacco Effort, White House May Model Program After
Massachusetts Campaign, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 8, 1995, at 3 (describing a similar
program in Massachusetts); Suein L. Hwang, Slick New Ads By Drug Firms Decry
Smoking, WALL ST. J., May 21, 1996, at B1, B9 (describing the success of the
California campaign and suggesting that a new wave of advertisements by compa
nies marketing smoking cessation drug products also may succeed in encouraging
efforts to quit).
150. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (reserving for Congress the "Power To lay and
collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises"); 26 U.S.C. § 5701 (1994) (imposing
federal taxes on cigarettes and other tobacco products). The FDA also could not
exact a "user fee" without special statutory authorization. See National Cable Televi
sion Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 340-41 (1974).
151. See supra notes 61-74 and accompanying text. More generally, after activist
FTC behavior in the 1970s, see, e.g., National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482
F.2d 672, 698 (D.C. Cir. 1973), Congress amended the governing statute to clarify
and constrain the Commission's rulemaking authority. See Magnuson-Moss Warranty
Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 93-637, § 109(a), 88 Stat.
2189 (1975) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2309 (1994»; see also JERRY L. MAsHAW ET AL.,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAw: THE AMERICAN PuBLIC LAw SYSTEM 428-29 (3d ed. 1992)
(describing subsequent congressional efforts to restrain the FTC).
152. See 42 Fed. Reg. 19,996, 20,002 (1977). The Agency's proposal would have
allowed saccharin to be marketed only as an OTC drug product and with an appro
priate cancer warning on the label. See id. at 20,004.
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bel. 153 Perhaps a similar fate will befall the FDA's tobacco ini
tiative, though this time Congress was content to await final
ization of the proposals.
The FDA's initiative appears vulnerable to judicial reversal
on a variety of statutory grounds, though ultimately this may be
entirely beside the point. The Agency may hope simply to
prompt congressional action. From that perspective, judging by
the industry's suggestions for a less burdensome legislative com
promise, the initiative already represents a partial success. 1M
On the other hand, the FDA should not be free to ignore the
outer boundaries of its delegated authority in pursuit of a well
meaning crusade against a public health problem. Imagine that
the Agency next decided to tackle handgun control or violence in
children's television programming, secure in the knowledge that
such an initiative might convince Congress to legislate a compro
mise but would never survive long enough to undergo careful
judicial scrutiny. Although these illustrations seem fanciful,
FDA action might not be entirely frivolous or implausible under
its broad statutory authority to regulate medical devices. l55

153. See Saccharin Study and Labeling Act, Pub. L. No. 95-203, § 4, 91 Stat.
1451, 1452 (1977) (codified at 21 u.s.c. § 343(oX1) (1994». The Act prohibits the
Agency from (1) revoking or amending any interim food regulations applicable to
saccharin, or (2) taking any other action to prohibit or restrict the sale or distribu
tion of saccharin or any food, drugs, or cosmetics which lawfully contain saccharin
solely on the basis of any carcinogenic or toxic effects revealed by studies available
before the date of enactment. See id. § 3, 91 Stat. at 1452; see also Pub. L. No.
102-142, tit. 6, 105 Stat. 878, 910 (1991) (extending moratorium until May 1, 1997);
Richard A. Merrill & Michael R. Taylor, Saccharin: A Case Study of Government
Regulation of Environmental Carcinogens, 5 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES LAw 1 (1985).
154. See AIix M. Freedman & Suein L. Hwang, Legislation Plan on Tobacco Ad
vances; WALL ST. J., Aug. 26, 1996, at A2 (describing proposal which would strip the
FDA of jurisdiction, enact many of the Agency's restrictions on access and advertis
ing, and insulate manufacturers from tort liability in exchange for significant contri
butions into an administrative compensation system); Suein L. Hwang & Timothy
Noah, Tobacco: Philip Morris Proposes Curbs on Sales to Kids, WALL ST. J., May 16,
1996, at B1 (describing an industry sponsored proposal for certain advertising
restrictions in exchange for a provisi9n explicitly stripping the FDA of jurisdiction);
see also Timothy Noah & Laurie McGinley, The FDA's David Kessler Savors Small
Victory Against Tobacco, WALL ST. J., Mar. 14, 1996, at B1 (reporting that one
company agreed to abide by most of the FDA's proposed restrictions as part of a
settlement of tort claims brought against it).
155. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (1994); supra note 104 (citing cases where the FDA
asserted jurisdiction over products not generally thought of as medical devices);
Gamerman, supra note 89, at 810-15; cf. Jeff Nesmith, House Refuses to Restore Gun
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CONSEQUENCES OF A DEVICE DESIGNATION

The classification of tobacco products as medical devic
es-restricted or otherwise-will have significant implications
wholly apart from the specific restrictions sought by the Agency
at this point. Indeed, the FDA's announced plans to pursue the
industry-sponsored educational campaign through its notifica
tion authority demonstrate the potential breadth of the Agency's
power over tobacco products once categorized as medical devices.
Under the terms of the statute, medical device firms must com
ply with a number of regulatory requirements governing product
manufacturing and premarket clearance, many of which are not
fully discussed in the preamble. Conversely, once subject to such
requirements, device manufacturers may benefit from a powerful
federal preemption defense to personal injury lawsuits.
A. Compliance with Generally Applicable Device Requirements

1. Adulteration and Misbranding Prohibitions.-At the out
set, all device manufacturers must comply with a number of
ongoing requirements. For example, once classified as medical
devices, the statute's basic adulteration and misbranding prohi
bitions would become fully applicable to tobacco products. 1OO In

Violence Study Funds, ATLANTA J. CONST., July 12, 1996, at 6A (describing congres
sional criticism of the CDC's collection of data on deaths attributable to guns). Even
so, any FDA initiatives in areas such as these would seem frivolous. With respect to
handguns, for example, its own prior construction of the statutory definition would
pose a serious but perhaps not insurmountable problem for the Agency, especially if
it does not expect that it will ever have to defend its legal position in federal court.
See 61 Fed. Reg. 44,619, 44,684-85 (1996) Gurisdictional statement) (disclaiming
authority over guns); Public Sale of Protective Chemical Sprays: Hearing Before the
Consumer Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 9lat Congo 36-37 (1969)
(statement of William W. Goodrich, FDA Chief Counsel) (explaining that products
such as guns and mace are not drugs or medical devices even though clearly intend
ed to affect the structure or function of the body); Gamerman, supra note 89, at 853
(suggesting a clarification of the definition of medical device to exclude items such
as bullet-proof vests and guns, even though this is an area "into which FDA has not
yet ventured").
156. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 351-352 (1994); United States v. Diapulse Corp. of Am.,
457 F.2d 25, 31 (2d Cir. 1972)' (affirming injunction against continued marketing of
misbranded devices); United States v. Torigian Lab., Inc., 577 F. Supp. 1514, 1517
(E.D.N.Y.) (upholding criminal conviction for device adulteration and misbranding),
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particular, a drug-delivery device can be marketed only for use
with an FDA-approved drug. Where an approved device is mar
keted for use with an unapproved drug, the Agency has declared
that the device is misbranded. 157
Under the Act, nicotine is a "new drug," the composition of
which is not "generally recognized as safe" (GRAS) and is, there
fore, not exempt from drug approval requirements. l58 The new
drug definition contains a grandfather clause which provides
that non-GRAS drugs previously subject to the 1906 predecessor
of the FD&C Act will not be deemed new drugs. 159 This
provision would not, however, relieve nicotine of its NDA ob
ligations because the grandfather clause does not apply once a
product is relabeled,l60 and tobacco products necessarily would
be relabeled under the Agency's medical device designation.
Nicotine has been approved only for use in smoking cessation
products and is unlikely ever to be approved for use in tobacco
products classified as drug-delivery systems. 16I

affd mem., 751 F.2d 373 (2d Cir. 1984).
157. See FDA Regulatory Letter No. 89-HFD-313-26 (Apr. 28, 1989), noted in
HUTI' & MERRILL, supra note 35, at 749 (warning that an approved infusion pump
was misbranded because its labeling promoted the pump for various unapproved
uses of several approved drug products). Similarly, an approved general purpose
medical device (such as a syringe) labeled for use with an unapproved drug (such as
heroin) would violate the misbranding prohibitions of the Act.
158. See, e.g., United States v. 50 Boxes More or Less, 909 F.2d 24, 26 (1st Cir.
1990); Tri-Bio Lab., Inc. v. United States, 836 F.2d 135, 142 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding
that the data presented were inadequate to find that an animal drug was generally
recognized as safe); United States v. Articles of Drug, 826 F.2d 564, 573 (7th Cir.
1987) (holding that certain toothpastes are "new drugs" under the FD&C Act);
United States v. Undetermined Quantities of "Cal-Ban 3000 . . . ," 776 F. Supp.
249, 256 (E.D.N.C. 1991) (holding that a weight loss product was a "new drug"
under the FD&C Act).
159. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(pX1).
160. See id.; see also United States v. Allan Drug Corp., 357 F.2d 713, 719-20
(10th Cir. 1966); F-D-C REPORTS ("The Pink Sheet"), July 4, 1994, at T&G-2 (de
scribing successful enforcement actions against .iodinated glycerol, which manufac
turers claimed to be exempt from new drug requirements under the grandfather
provisions).
161. Perhaps the closest parallel example is methadone, which is intended for use
in the treatment of heroin addiction. See American Pharm. Ass'n v. Weinberger, 377
F. Supp. 824, 829 n.9 (D.D.C. 1974) ("FDA's discretion under the Act's NDA provi
sions is limited to either approving or denying NDA's and nowhere is FDA empow
ered to approve an NDA upon the condition that the drug be distributed only
through specified channels."), affd, 530 F.2d 1054 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (per curiam). The
FDA revised its methadone regulations in response to this decision by deleting the
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Other requirements include good manufacturing practice
(GMP) controls,162 which are enforced through periodic in
spections,163 and the reporting of adverse reactions to (or the
malfunctioning of) medical devices. 164 Under these regulations,
manufacturers must report all information which suggests that
a medical device may have caused or contributed to a death or
serious injury.165 The FDA can order a mandatory recall of a
medical device, and it can prohibit further marketing if there is
a reasonable probability that continued distribution of the device
would cause serious adverse health consequences or death. l66
Thus, unless specifically exempted, tobacco manufacturers will
have to submit an adverse reaction report each time a product
related injury occurs. In the fmal tobacco regulations, the FDA
has required that manufacturers submit reports only of unex
pected adverse events and instances of contamination or changes
in the manufacturing process. 167

restrictions on methadone distribution to pharmacies. See 41 Fed. Reg. 28,261 (1976).
Unlike methadone, however, nicotine does not treat any medical condition unless it
is used in a smoking cessation product to reduce withdrawal symptoms.
162. See 21 U.S.C. § 360i; 21 C.F.R. pt. 820 (1996); see also 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396,
44,411 (1996).
163. See, e.g., In re Establishment Inspection of Medtronic, Inc., 500 F. Supp.
536, 538-40 (D. Minn. 1980). The Agency regularly takes enforcement action against
medical device manufacturers for GMP violations. See, e.g., United States v. Laerdal
Mfg. Corp., 853 F. Supp. 1219, 1222-23, 1227-35 (D. Or. 1994), affd, 73 F.3d 852
(9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Barr Lab., Inc., 812 F. Supp. 458, 465 (D.N.J.
1993); United States v. Undetermined Quantities of Various Articles, 800 F. Supp.
499, 502-03 (S.D. Tex. 1992); United States v. 789 Cases ... Surgeons' Gloves, 799
F. Supp. 1275, 1287-93 (D.P.R. 1992).
164. See 21 C.F.R. pt. 803.
165. The regulations require a report whenever a· device manufacturer becomes
aware of information "[i]n the medical or scientific literature, whether published or
unpublished, that reasonably suggests that one of its marketed devices (A) may have
caused or contributed to a death or serious injury." 21 C.F.R. § 803.24(aX2Xi). The
regulation requires that device manufacturers report the adverse event by telephone
within five calendar days of its occurrence, followed up by a written report within
15 working days. See id. § 803.24(bX1).
166. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 360e(e), 360h(e). Criminal penalties also may be imposed
for failures to abide by the PMA requirements. See, e.g., United States v. C.R. Bard,
Inc., 848 F. Supp. 287, 293 (D. Mass. 1994) (approving plea agreement imposing
fines totalling more than $62 million).
167. See 21 C.F.R. § 803.19(0. User facilities are entirely exempt, see id.
§ 803.19(g), and distributors only need to report contamination, see id. § 804.25(c);
see also 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,410-11. The FDA estimates that it will receive approxi
mately fifty such reports per year. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,612. One manufacturer
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The Agency notes the existence of most of these generally
applicable medical device requirements;l68 however, the pream
ble accompanying the final regulations provides few details
about the consequences of applying these provisions. Instead,
the FDA focuses on the "special" requirements it will apply to
tobacco products. The Agency may be hoping to finesse the issue
and avoid actually applying these other provisions,169 but the
regulations do not specifically exempt tobacco products from
many of these medical device requirements, nor is it clear that
the FDA even has the authority to permit such an exclusion.170

2. Classification and Approval for Marketing.-In addition
to these general controls, all medical devices must be classified
by the FDA.l7l In classifying a device, the FDA must consider
the persons for whose use the device is intended, the conditions
of intended use, and it must "weigh[] any probable benefit to
health from the use of the device against any probable risk of
injury or illness from such use."172 Under this classification

recently recalled billions of cigarettes because of possible chemical contamination. See
Inquiry Sees Nothing Unusual in Batch of Recalled Cigarettes, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 29,
1996, at A9.
168. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,404, 44,409-11, 44,540 (noting that tobacco product
manufacturers will have "to comply with the existing device registration and listing
requirements," but that distributors are exempt); 60 Fed. Reg. 41,314, 41,352 (1995)
(conceding that, "[als devices, the products would also be subject to various pre
existing requirements in the statute and regulations," including general labeling re
quirements for devices, establishment registration and device listing requirements,
and good manufacturing practice requirements).
169. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,404 ("Although FDA intends to impose on cigarettes
and smokeless tobacco all requirements applicable to devices, the act does not
provide that these requirements should all be imposed immediately.").
170. See infra notes 186-190 and accompanying text; cf. 21 U.S.C. § 336 (autho
rizing the FDA to ignore minor statutory violations); Monsanto Co. v. Kennedy, 613
F.2d 947, 954-55 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (finding that FDA enjoyed inherent discretion to
apply a de minimis exception); United States v. 449 Cases, Containing Tomato
Paste, 212 F.2d 567, 575 (2d Cir. 1954); United States v. General Foods Corp., 446
F. Supp. 740, 746 (N.D.N.Y. 1978).
171. See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(aX1XC); 21 C.F.R. pt. 860; see also General Medical
Co. v. FDA, 770 F.2d 214, 216-17 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (summarizing classification proce
dure); Contact Lens Mfrs. Ass'n v. FDA, 766 F.2d 592, 599-603 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(same); Hearings Before the Sen. Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, lOlst
Congo 1 (1990) (describing the Medical Device Amendments' (MDA) "three-tiered
scheme that regulated medical devices according to their risk").
172. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(aX2).
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system, tobacco products would fall into Class III as extremely
hazardous devices. 173
Second, manufacturers of medical devices must obtain some
sort of premarket clearance for their products. When it recently
announced plans to introduce a smokeless cigarette, one compa
ny expressed concerns that the FDA would demand that the
product undergo a protracted premarket review procedure. 174
Premarket approval (PMA) represents the most rigorous
clearance requirement and eventually will be required for all
Class III medical devices. 175 The PMA is essentially a product
license which imposes precise conditions governing the manu
facture and labeling of a device and from which no deviation is
permitted. 176 Under the PMA provisions, all devices must be
tested for safety and effectiveness, usually under an investiga
tional device exemption (IDE).177 The PMA application must
contain, among other things, a description of the device and its
principles of operation, manufacturing methods and controls,
labeling and directions for use, and detailed test data, including
clinical data from controlled studies in humans, demonstrating
the product's safety and effectiveness. 178 When the FDA issues
a PMA, it has decided that the device is safe and effective (and
173. See id. § 360c(aXIXCXiiXII) (requiring a Class III designation for devices
which "present[] a potential unreasonable risk of illness or i~ury"); see also 61 Fed.
Reg. at 44,411-13 (conceding that tobacco products eventually will be classified but
suggesting that it might avoid a Class III designation by taking into account the
negative public health consequences of a prohibition). In 1977 and 1978, a public
interest group filed citizen petitions requesting that the FDA assert jurisdiction over
attached and detached cigarette filters as medical devices, based on a recommenda
tion by an advisory committee that they be classified as Class 111 devl.ces. See 'H.UTI
& MERRILL, supra note 35, at 384. T\le Agency refused to regulate either type of
cigarette filter as a medical device absent any therapeutic labeling claims. See 47
Fed. Reg. 31,130, 31,132 (1982); see also Study Hints of Lung Danger in Cigarettes,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1995, at A12 (reporting on a recent study which revealed that
pieces of cigarette filters break off during use and become lodged in the lungs).
174. See Feder, supra note 36, at A7.
175. See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(aXIXCXiiXII); 21 C.F.R. § 814.1(c); see also United
States v. Various Articles of Device ... , 814 F. Supp. 32, 33 (E.D. Tenn. 1992).
176. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 351(0(1), 360e; 21 C.F.R. § 814.80 ("A device may not be
manufactured, packaged, stored, labeled, distributed, or advertised in a manner that
is inconsistent with any conditions to approval specified in the PMA approval order
for the device."); Ethicon, Inc. v. FDA, 762 F. Supp. 382, 384 n.2 (D.D.C. 1991)
("Pre-market approval involves the most rigorous review of devices under the Act.").
177. See 21 U.S.C. § 360j(g); 21 C.F.R. § 812.
178. See 21 U.S.C. § 360e(c); 21 C.F.R. § 814.
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not adulterated or misbranded) as long as it complies with the
conditions specified in the application.
Even if the Agency regarded tobacco products as
"grandfathered" Class III devices temporarily exempt from PMA
requirements, § 510(k) of the FD&C Act requires the submission
of a premarket notification (PMN).179 With the exception of cer
tain Class I devices for which the FDA does not require a PMN,
and Class III devices for which the Agency requires the submis
sion of PMAs, medical devices may be marketed only if they
were introduced before May 28, 1976, or are "substantially
equivalent" to a device marketed before that date. ISO A PMN
would be required each time a company introduces a new prod
uct or design,181 and it must include proposed labeling and an
explanation of how the device is substantially equivalent in in
tended use and technological characteristics to a particular pred
icate device. 182 The FDA reviews PMN submissions to ensure
that the new device is substantially equivalent to an identified
predicate device. After a substantial equivalence determination
has been made by the FDA, the device may be marketed. If
significant changes later are made to the device, either a supple
ment to the original PMN or a brand new PMN is required. l83
The 510(k) notification must either contain an adequate
179. See 21 u.s.C. § 360(k); 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,410, 44,463 (1996).
180. See 21 u.S.C. § 360c{i) (defining "substantially equivalent" as having the
same intended uses and the same technological characteristics as the predicate
device); 21 C.F.R. § 807.81 (same). If the new device has different technological
characteristics, the PMN must contain information, including clinical data, dem
onstrating that the device is as safe and effective as a legally marketed predicate
device. See 21 U.S.C. § 360c{i); see also 21 C.F.R. § 807.100; 57 Fed. Reg. 58,400,
58,403 (1992).
181. See 21 C.F.R. § 807.81(aX3).
182. See id. § 807.87 (detailing required elements of a PMN submission). In the
case of a Class II device subject to a performance standard, the manufacturer must
demonstrate that the device conforms to any such standard. See 21 U.S.C. § 360d;
21 C.F.R. § 807.87(d). The FDA may establish performance standards "to provide
reasonable assurance of the safety and effectiveness of the device." 21 U.S.C.
§ 360d(aX1). A performance standard may include provisions regarding construction,
ingredients, testing, or measurement of the device's performance, and such a stan
dard may restrict the sale and distribution of the device to the extent permitted in
the restricted device provisions of the Act. See id. § 360d(aX2).
183. See 21 C.F.R. § 807.81(aX3); 42 Fed. Reg. 42,520, 42,522 (1977); United
States v. An Article of Device Consisting of 1,217 Cardboard Boxes, 607 F. Supp.
990, 996·97 (W.D. Mich. 1985); see also 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,612 (1996) (estimat
ing that there are presently 1,000 varieties of tobacco products on the market).
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summary of any information concerning safety and effectiveness,
including adverse health effects, or state that such information
will be made available to any person upon request. l84 When
the Agency receives a PMN that it regards as incomplete, it may
request additional information. The failure to include adequate
evidence of safety and effectiveness may result in a finding that
a device is not "substantially equivalent" to a predicate device.
In addition, the Agency has demanded that manufacturers pro
vide clinical data to support their claims that any technological
changes did not impact safety and effectiveness. l85
In partial recognition of these hurdles, the FDA noted in its
proposal that "on occasion the agency has choseri not to use
premarket approval for critical devices that potentially raise
significant safety and efficacy issues" even though approval
provides the greatest regulatory control,l86 adding that agen
cies enjoy significant discretion in enforcement matters, as rec
ognized by the Supreme Court in Heckler v. Chaney.187 Al
though the Court in that case upheld the FDA's decision not to
enforce premarket approval requirements for lethal injection
drugs,l86 that situation is not analogous to the regulation of
tobacco products as medical devices. The decision in Chaney
184. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(lXAXiiXI), (3XA); 21 C.F.R. § 807.93.
185. See H.R. REp. No. 101-808, at 25 (1990); Richard M. Cooper, Clinical Data
under Section 501(k), 42 FOOD DRUG COSMo L.J. 192 (1987); Ellen J. Flannery, The
Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990: An Overview, 46 FOOD DRUG COSMo L.J. 129, 131
(1991).
186. See 60 Fed. Reg. 41,314, 41,349 (1995) (stating that premarket approval is
generally regarded as providing the greatest regulatory control, but that other
regulations would be more appropriate). As further precedent, the FDA points to its
recent announcement that it will no longer enforce PMA requirements for heart
valve allografts. See id. (citing 59 Fed. Reg. 52,078 (1994». In fact, the Agency had
little choice in the matter. See Northwest Tissue Ctr. V. Shalala, 1 F.3d 522, 536
(7th Cir. 1993) (remanding to district court to determine whether FDA gave ade
quate notice to heart valve allograft distributors that these products were included
in a rule subjecting replacement heart valves to PMA requirements); Alabama Tissue
Ctr. V. Sullivan, 975 F.2d 373, 379 (7th Cir. 1992) (including heart valve allografts
in definition of biologic valves under FDA rule). The Agency subsequently withdrew
the rule applying PMA requirements to valve allografts. See 59 Fed. Reg. 52,078
(1994). Wholly apart from judicial compulsion, it is difficult to see how the FDA can
view an action relaxing regulatory controls on a dangerous but medically useful
product as analogous to its proposal to regulate tobacco products (which have no
medical benefits) under the "flexible" medical device provisions.
187. 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
188. See Heckler, 470 U.S. at 837.
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applies when the Agency imposes statutory requirements on a
product but then, in its discretion, chooses not to enforce these
requirements. In the case of tobacco products, however, the FDA
apparently intends to decline imposing certain mandatory device
requirements on tobacco products at the outset.lS9 The Agency
cannot forever ignore Congress' statutory directives. l90

3. Disclosure of Trade Secret Information.-The application
of these various medical device requirements to tobacco products
also may result in the disclosure of information currently pro
tected as trade secrets. Pursuant to the cigarette labeling stat
ute, manufacturers must submit annual ingredient lists to HHS,
but the lists need not specifically identify the company or the
brand of cigarettes. 191 All information submitted under the
statute is considered trade secret information,I92 and federal

189. See 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,416 (1996). The statute requires, for example,
that "the Secretary shall classify all such devices . . . into the classes" established
by the Act. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(bX1) (1994) (emphasis added); see also id. §§ 360(k)
(premarket notification requirement), 360i(a) (adverse event reporting). Where the
statute is not drawn in mandatory terms, of course, the FDA is free to exempt
certain devices from general controls. See 60 Fed. Reg. 59,557, 59,560 (1995) (de
scribing recent exemptions of several low-risk devices from such general controls); cf.
Doe v. Sullivan, 938 F.2d 1370, 1382 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (upholding FDA regulation
exempting biowarfare vaccines from IND requirements under certain limited circum
stances); Jeffrey M. Sellers, Note, Regulatory Values and the Exceptions Process, 93
YALE L.J. 938, 957 (1984).
190. See, e.g., Cutler v. Hayes, 818 F.2d 879, 895 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("Although
FDA's discretion extends to review of OTe drugs by ingredient rather than by
product . . . the agency lacks authority to simply do nothing to effectuate the
purpose of the Act."); Cutler v. Kennedy, 475 F. Supp. 838, 854 (D.D.C. 1979) ('The
Commissioner's OTC regulations formally authorize the continued marketing of
Category III drug products in the absence of an administrative determination that
those products are, today, generally recognized by experts as safe and effective. That
flies in the face of the statutory scheme."); id. at 856 ("FDA may not lawfully
maintain Category III in any form in which drugs with Category III conditions . . .
are exempted from enforcement action. Informally, of course, the FDA will be free to
exercise its discretion . . . not to seek enforcement actions."); see also Ronald M.
Levin, Understanding Unreviewability in Administrative Law, 74 MINN. L. REV. 689,
753-79 (1990) (canvassing various limitations on an agency's discretion not to act).
191. See 15 U.S.C. § 1335a(a) (1994); see also Mark A. Rothstein, Refusing to
Employ Smokers: Good Public Health or Bad Public Policy?, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
940, 943 (1987) ('Tobacco smoke contains between three thousand and four thousand
chemicals, more than twenty of which have been shown to cause cancer or tumors.").
No reports on other tobacco products or on tobacco injuries or deaths are required.
192. See 15 U.S.C. § 1335a(bX2XA).
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officials cannot disclose any of the ingredients except to Con
gress. 193
At least two of the generally applicable medical device regu
lations arguably would require that manufacturers of tobacco
products disclose ingredient information. First, a PMN submis
sion requires specification of the "material[s] used" in the de
vice. l94 Second, GMP controls require that manufacturers
maintain a "device master record" available to inspectors which
must contain the device's "formulation" and information about
components. 195 Both of ,these regulations provide that the re
quired information will be kept confidential only to the extent
authorized by the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).l96 The
FDA's implementing regulations define trade secrets as "infor
mation which is used in one's business and is of a type custom
arily held in strict confidence or regarded as privileged and not
disclosed to any member of the public by the person to whom it
belongs. "197 Because tobacco companies regularly submit ingre
193. The Secretary of HHS is empowered to report to Congress any research
findings or other information which suggest that one or more of the listed ingredi
ents poses a health risk to smokers. See id. § 1335a(bXl); see also Barbara Carton,
Tobacco: State Demands List of Contents for Cigarettes, WALL ST. J., Aug. 2, 1996,
at Bl (describing passage of ingredient disclosure law in Massachusetts and tobacco
industry plans to challenge it as inconsistent with trade secret protection under
federal law).
194. See 21 C.F.R. § 807.92(aX4) (1996) (requiring a description of the device,
"including an explanation of how the device functions" and "the significant physi
cal . . . characteristics of the device, such as device design [and] material[s] used").
It should be noted, however, that these requirements "have been modified to reflect
the agency's intention that trade secret and confidential commercial information be
protected." 59 Fed. Reg. 64,287, 64,289 (1994) (adding that the 510(k) summary
should be provided "in a form that is clear, concise, and adequate, but not so
detailed as to disclose trade secret information").
195. See 21 C.F.R. § 820.181(a); 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,540-41 (1996) (explaining
the scope of the FDA's authority to inspect records); see also id. at 44,463-64 (dis
cussing the inapplicability of trade secret protection but declining to impose ingredi
ent labeling requirements).
196. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(bX4) (1994); see also 21 C.F.R. § 20.61(c) (providing that
data and information submitted to the FDA which fall within definitions of trade
secret or confidential commercial information are not available for public disclosure
under FOIA); Critical Mass Energy Project v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 975 F.2d
871, 877-78 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (en bane). FOIA also exempts from disclosure other
information if a different statute requires that it be withheld from the public. See 5
U.S.C. § 552(bX3). The cigarette labeling statute, however, only prohibits the disclo
sure of ingredient information submitted to HHS under that particular reporting re
quirement. See 15 U.S.C. § 1335a(bX2XA) (1994).
197. 21 C.F.R. § 20.61(b); see also Public Citizen Health Research Group v. FDA,
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dient information to their trade association, it may be difficult to
argue that this data qualifies for trade secret protection. Thus, if
generally applicable medical device provisions will apply to to
bacco products under the new FDA regulations, then the effect
may be to circumvent the special trade secret provisions current
ly applicable to ingredient lists.

*****
At this juncture, the FDA has not been fully candid about
the possible consequences of applying all of these medical device
requirements to cigarettes. If the Agency decides that tobacco
product manufacturers need to comply with only a small subset
of the requirements applicable to all other devices, public inter
est groups undoubtedly will challenge the failure to enforce
those other requirements. l98 Moreover, even if the Agency were
properly exercising its discretion by not enforcing the other pro
visions of the statute, the tobacco industry has no assurances
that this policy would continue; absent an exemption formalized
in the final rule, the FDA could easily change its mind and bring
enforcement actions at a later date. The Agency's assertion of
jurisdiction over cigarettes as medical devices logically carries
with it the application of all medical device regulatory require
ments to manufacturers of tobacco products.

B. The Preemption Dimension
Perhaps the most alarming possible consequence of the
Agency's decision to regulate tobacco products using its authori
ty over medical devices is the added protection against tort lia
704 F.2d 1280, 1290-91 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (holding that commercial information could
be given confidentiality if its disclosure would "cause substantial harm to the com
petitive position of the person from whom the information was obtained").
198. Cf. Action on Smoking & Health v. Harris, 655 F.2d 236, 243 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (upholding the FDA's rejection of a public interest group's citizen petition
requesting that cigarettes be regulated as drugs); Public Citizen v. Commissioner of
FDA, 724 F. Supp. 1013, 1019-20 (D.D.C. 1989) (ordering the FDA to promulgate
tampon absorbency labeling regulations within two months, and criticizing the FDA's
seven-year delay in issuing these regulations); Public Citizen v. Heckler, 653 F.
Supp. 1229, 1241 (D.D.C. 1986) (granting petition for review where the FDA had
rejected requests that it regulate raw milk).
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bility that this may give manufacturers. Unlike most other in
dustries subject to FDA regulation, device manufacturers cur
rently benefit from a statutory provision expressly preempting
nonidentical state requirements. l99 Almost without exception,
lower courts have held that this provision preempts tort claims
to the extent that the FDA regulates a particular device,2OO and
the Supreme Court's latest decision on this question simply
demands that the Agency requirement be specific to the device
in question. 201 By contrast, cigarette manufacturers heretofore
have enjoyed a substantially more limited preemption defense
against products liability claims.

1. The Existing Defense Against Failure-to- Warn
Claims.-Since 1965, Congress has prescribed the warnings that
must appear on the labels of cigarette packages.202 At present,
cigarette manufacturers are protected from inconsistent state la
beling regulations so long as they comply with the federal warn
ing statute.203 In Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,204 the Su
199. The statute provides in relevant part as follows:
000 State or political subdivision of a State may establish or continue in
effect with respect to a device intended for human use any requirement
(1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable
under this chapter to the device, and
.
(2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any
other matter included in a requirement applicable to the device under this
chapter.
21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (1994). This provision was part of the MDA enacted in 1976.
See Pub. L. No. 94-295, § 2, 90 Stat. 540, 574. A limited class of FDA food labeling
requirements also expressly preempt state law. See 21 U.S.C. § 343-1(a).
200. See Lars Noah, Amplification of Federal Preemption in Medical Device Cases,
49 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 183, 199-200 (1994). A number of courts have found that no
claims are preempted because a particular device is not regulated by FDA. See, e.g.,
Anguiano v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 44 F.3d 806, 810 (9th Cir. 1995);
Oliver v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc., 863 F. Supp. 251, 253-55 (W.D. Pa. 1994). Only
a few have held that tort claims are never preempted. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Collagen
Corp., 67 F.3d 1453, 1458-59 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2579 (1996);
Haudrich v. Howmedica, Inc., 642 N.E.2d 206, 215 (III. App. 1994), affd, 662 N.E.2d
1248 (III. 1996); see also Robert S. Adler & Richard A. Mann, Preemption and
Medical Devices: The Courts Run Amok, 59 Mo. L. REV. 895, 916-42 (1994) (criticiz
ing trend toward finding express preemption of common law claims).
201. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 2240, 2255-58 (1996). Four members
of the Court suggested that the MDA does not preempt any tort claims. See id. at
2251-53, 2259 (plurality)..
202. See supra Part TI.A.2.
203. See 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1994) ("No requirement or prohibition based on
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preme Court held that this statute also expressly preempts prod
ucts liability actions grounded on failure-to-warn (but not other)
claims, even though the provision did not explicitly delineate
any such claims as subject to preemption. 205 Justice Stevens,
writing for himself and three other members of the Court on this
question, focused on the breadth of the statutory phrase "re
quirement or prohibition," concluding that it "sweeps broadly
and suggests no distinction between positive enactments and
common law; to the contrary, those words easily encompass
obligations that take the form of common-law rules.,,206
Justice Stevens proceeded to evaluate each of plaintiff's
claims to determine whether it was preempted. First, he found
preemption of the failure-to-warn claim.207 The plaintiff's ex-

smoking and health shall be imposed under State law with respect to the advertis·
ing or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity
with the provisions of this chapter."); Bee also Vango Media, Inc. v. City of New
York, 34 F.3d 68, 75 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that city ordinance mandating certain
warnings in cigarette advertisements was preempted by federal law).
204. 505 U.S. 504 (1992) (plurality).
205. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 525-29 (Stevens, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J.,
White, and O'Connor, JJ.) (concluding that breach of "express warranty and certain
fraudulent misrepresentation claims were not preempted). Two other Justices found
an even broader preemptive effect in the statute and would have held all common
law claims preempted under the 1969 amendment. See id. at 544-56 (Scalia, J.,
joined by Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The remaining
three Justices would have held none of the claims preempted. See id. at 534-44
(Blackmun, J., joined by Kennedy and Souter, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). Because the Court was fragmented on the preemptive force of the 1969
provision, "and no single rationale explaining the result enjoy[ed] the assent of five
Justices," the holding may be viewed as the position taken by those concurring on
the narrowest grounds. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977); Bee
also Nichols v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1921, 1926 (1994) ("This test is more easily
stated than applied to the various opinions supporting the result in" a particular
case.).
206. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 521-22 (Stevens, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., White,
and O'Connor, JJ.) ("[C]ommon-Iaw damages actions of the sort raised by petitioner
are premised on the existence of a legal duty, and it is difficult to say that such
actions do not impose 'requirements or prohibitions."'); see also CSX Transp., Inc. v.
Easterwood, 113 S. Ct. 1732, 1737 (1993).
207. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 524-25. The Court stated that:
Thus, insofar as claims under either failure-to-warn theory require a showing
that respondents' post-1969 advertising or promotions should have included
additional, or more clearly stated, warnings, those claims are pre-empted. The
Act does not, however, pre-empt petitioner's claims that rely solely on
respondents' testing or research practices or other actions unrelated to adver
tising or promotion.
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press warranty claim was not, however, preempted because the
imposition of liability would arise from the breach of "a contrac
tual commitment voluntarily undertaken" by the warrantor
rather than from a violation of any requirement imposed under
state law. 208 Justice Stevens then subdivided plaintiffs
fraudulent misrepresentation claim into two distinct theories:
one alleging that the companies' advertising neutralized the
effect of the warnings mandated by Congress, a claim which was
preempted just as the failure-to-warn claim,209 and one alleg
ing violations of a more general duty not to conceal material
facts, a claim which was not preempted "insofar as those claims
rely on a state law duty to disclose such facts through channels
of communication other than advertising or promotion."210
Thus, Cipollone only preempts a limited subset of tort
claims involving cigarettes. For instance, Justice Stevens noted
that the statute would not preempt claims alleging defects in
manufacturing or product design.211 In addition, plaintiffs su
ing cigarette manufacturers have managed to elude Cipollone by
recasting inadequate warning claims as, for example, fraud or
breach of express warranty.212 Finally, Cipollone provides no

Id.
208. See id. at 526. "[Al contractual requirement, although only enforceable under
state law, is not 'imposed' by the State, but rather is 'imposed' by the contracting
party upon itself." Id. at 526 n.24; see also American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 115 S.
Ct. 817, 824-26 (1995) (holding that Airline Deregulation Act did not preempt breach
of contract claims involving frequent flyer program).
209. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 527-28 ("Such a claim is predicated on a state-law
prohibition against statements in advertising and promotional materials that tend to
minimize the health hazards associated with smoking."). "In this light it seems quite
clear that petitioner's first theory of fraudulent misrepresentation is inextricably
related to petitioner's first failure-to-warn theory, a theory that we have already con
cluded is largely pre-empted by § 5(b)." Id. at 528.
210. Id. "State-law prohibitions on false statements of material fact do not create
'diverse, nonuniform, and confusing' standards. Unlike state law obligations concern
ing the warning necessary to render a product 'reasonably safe,' state-law proscrip
tions on intentional fraud rely only on a single, uniform standard: falsity." Id. at
529. Similarly, Justice Stevens took the position that the plaintiffs conspiracy to
commit such fraud was not preempted. See id. at 530.
211. See id. at 523.
212. See, e.g., Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 870 F. Supp. 1425, 1432-34 (E.D.
La. 1994) (rejecting preemption defense against fraud and deceit, negligent misrepre
sentation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, violation of consumer protection
statutes, breach of express and implied warranties, negligent manufacturing and
design, and strict liability claims); Grinnell v. American Tobacco Co., 883 S.W.2d
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defense for manufacturers of smokeless tobacco products. 213

2. Broader Preemption for Device Manufacturers.-Both
before and after Cipollone, express preemption as a defense to
tort liability has arisen most frequently in products liability
litigation against manufacturers of medical devices. Congress
expressed an even broader intent to preempt state laws applica
ble to medical devices than the provision at issue in Cipollone.
The 1969 legislation only preempted requirements or prohibi
tions related to the promotion of cigarettes.214 By comparison,
the MDA preempts any state medical device requirement which
is different from or in addition to an applicable FDA require
ment and "which relates to" either the safety or effectiveness of
the device or "any other matter included in a requirement appli
cable to the device under this chapter."215
For instance, courts have dismissed claims against tampon
manufacturers for failure to warn of toxic shock syndrome be
cause the FDA imposes specific warning requirements for these
products. 216 More recent preemption decisions involving med
ical devices are even more sweeping, holding that premarket
approval by the Agency defeats a variety of common law claims
including those alleging defective design, testing, manufacture,
or labeling.217 Courts have been only slightly more hesitant to

791, 797-98 (Tex. App. 1994) (same); cf. Mangini v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 875
P.2d 73, 80-83 (Cal.) (holding that claim for violation of state consumer protection
statute was not preempted), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 577 (1994); Kyte v. Philip
Morris, Inc., 556 N.E.2d 1025, 1030 (Mass. 1990) (rejecting preemption defense to
claims by minors addicted to cigarettes alleging breach of implied warranty and
violation of state consumer protection statute).
213. The Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act preempts only
state statutes or regulations. See 15 U.S.C. § 4406(b), (c) (1994) ("Nothing in this
chapter shall relieve any person from liability at common law or under State statu
tory law to any other person."); see also Marsee v. United States Tobacco Co., 639 F.
Supp. 466 (W.D. Okla. 1986) (describing products liability claims brought against the
manufacturer of a smokeless tobacco product), affd, 866 F.2d 319 (10th Cir. 1989).
214. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 530-3l.
215. See 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (1994); see also Noah, supra note 200, at 184-88.
216. See National Bank of Commerce v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 38 F.3d 988, 990
92 (8th Cir. 1994); Moore v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 867 F.2d 243, 246-47 (5th Cir.
1989).
217. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Collagen Corp., 67 F.3d 1268, 1280-81 (7th Cir. 1995)
(injectable collagen), vacated, 116 S. Ct. 2576 (1996); Michael v. Shiley, Inc., 46 F.3d
1316, 1324-31 (3d Cir.) (artificial heart valve), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 67 (1995);
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find preemption of tort claims against manufacturers of devices
distributed without full premarket approval, such as those being
used in clinical trials pursuant to the FDA's investigational de
vice exemption,21s or devices cleared for marketing under
§ 510(k) as substantially equivalent to an existing product,219
though the Supreme Court has now significantly restricted the
scope of preemption in the latter situation.22o
Although no court has suggested that federal law preempts
all tort claims against all devices, there is a growing consensus
that such claims are preempted to the extent that the FDA regu
lates a particular device, whether through published regulations
or the individualized review and approval of applications to
market a medical device. These decisions are more expansive
than Cipollone. For instance, a few courts have held that breach
of express warranty claims are preempted. 221 Indeed, a number
of lower courts have found sweeping preemption of tort claims
even in instances where the manufacturer has failed to comply

Martello v. CIBA Vision Corp., 42 F.3d 1167, 1169 (8th Cir. 1994) (contact lens
solution), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2614 (1995); King v. Collagen Corp., 983 F.2d
1130, 1133-36 (1st Cir. 1993) (injectable collagen); Stamps v. Collagen Corp., 984
F.2d 1416, 1421-25 (5th Cir. 1993) (injectable collagen). But see Kennedy v. Collagen
Corp., 67 F.3d 1453, 1458-59 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that the MDA never preempts
tort claims, refusing to follow the consensus position of the other circuits), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 2579 (1996).
218. See, e.g., Martin v. Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 70 F.3d 39, 41-42 (6th Cir.
1995) (pacemaker), vacated, 116 S. Ct. 2576 (1996); Becker v. Optical Radiation
Corp., 66 F.3d 18, 20-21 (2d Cir. 1995) (intraocular lenses); Gile v. Optical Radiation
Corp., 22 F.3d 540, 541-42 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 429 (1994); Duncan v.
IOLAB Corp., 12 F.3d 194 (11th Cir. 1994) (per curiam); Slater v. Optical Radiation
Corp., 961 F.2d 1330, 1333 (7th Cir. 1992); Hunsaker v. Surgidev Corp., 818 F.
Supp. 744, 753 (M.D. Pa. 1992), affd mem., 5 F.3d 1489 (3d Cir. 1993).
219. See, e.g., English v. Mentor Corp., 67 F.3d 477, 481-83 (3d Cir. 1995) (penile
prosthesis), vacated, 116 S. Ct. 2575 (1996); Duvall v. Bristol-Myers-Squibb Co., 65
F.3d 392, 398-401 (4th Cir. 1995) (penile prosthesis), vacated, 116 S. Ct. 2575 (1996);
Reeves v. AcroMed Corp., 44 F.3d 300, 305-07 (5th Cir.) (metal bone plate and
screws), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2251 (1995); Mendes v. Medtronic, Inc., 18 F.3d 13,
17-19 (1st Cir. 1994) (pacemaker); cf. Feldt v. Mentor Corp., 61 F.3d 431, 436-38
(5th Cir. 1995) (premarket clearance would preempt warning and manufacturing but
not design defect claims), vacated, 116 S. Ct. 2575 (1996).
220. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 2240, 2255-58 (1996) (holding that
none of the products liability claims against a pacemaker manufacturer were pre
empted because the generic premarket notification, good manufacturing practice, and
labeling regulations did not impose any specific FDA requirements on the device).
221. See Martin, 70 F.3d at 42; Duvall, 65 F.3d at 400-01; Martello, 42 F.3d at
1169; King, 983 F.2d at 1135-36. But see Mitchell, 67 F.3d at 1285.
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with FDA requirements. 222
The FDA's new advertising and labeling restrictions might
preempt failure-to-warn and related claims against manufactur
ers of both cigarettes and smokeless tobacco products. If tobacco
companies file premarket notifications in the future, courts may
hold that certain design defect and other labeling claims are
preempted, notwithstanding the Medtronic decision.223 Even
the specific application of medical device GMP requirements to
tobacco products could preempt manufacturing defect claims.224
The FDA surely does not intend to protect manufacturers in
this manner.225 Indeed, the Agency has previously expressed
its disagreement with any preemption of tort claims against
device manufacturers,226 but it has not yet persuaded the
courts. The tobacco industry mayor may not recognize the po
tential benefits of a medical device approach to regulation, but it
certainly has not broached the subject in public. 227
222. See, e.g., Talbott v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 63 F.3d 25, 30-31 (1st Cir. 1995), cert.
dismissed, 116 S. Ct. 1892 (1996); Michael, 46 F.3d at 1328-29; Reeves, 44 F.3d at
307. For an argument that these courts have seriously misinterpreted Cipollone in
this respect, see Lars Noah, Reconceptualizing Federal Preemption of Tort Claims as
the Government Standards Defense, 37 WM. & MARy L. REV. 903 (1996). The Su
preme Court recently suggested that the defense would not apply in such circum
stances. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2255; id. at 2264 (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
223. See Lars Noah, The Pre-emption Morass, LEGAL TIMES, July 29, 1996, at
S37 (explaining the limited scope of the plurality's decision); Noah, supra note 200,
at 208-10 (suggesting meaningful differences in the PMN review process before and
after 1990).
224. See Duvall, 65 F.3d at 399; Mendes, 18 F.3d at 19 (holding that "plaintiffs
negligent manufacturing claim (including her allegations of negligent manufacturing,
control, maintenance, inspection, testing, servicing, distribution, and sale of the
device) is preempted by FDA regulations on good manufacturing practices").
225. See 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,550 (1996) ("FDA does not expect any of these
Federal requirements to preempt any tort claims relating to tobacco products.").
226. In one recent appeal, the Department of Justice filed an amicus curiae brief,
explaining the FDA's opposition to preemption in this case. See Brief for the United
States as Amicus Curiae, Talbott v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 63 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 1995) (No.
94-1951), noted in 22 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) 1230 (1994). Indeed, as
suggested in the brief, the Agency does not believe that the MDA ever preempts
common law claims. Id. at 14 n.5; see also Duvall, 65 F.3d at 401 n.9. Although
courts will defer to agency interpretations against statutory preemption, see Ameri
can Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 115 S. Ct. 817, 821-22, 824-25 (1995), the FDA cannot
quite so easily disavow in litigation papers what appears to be a formal and long
standing construction of the statute, see Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S.
204, 212-13 (1988).
227. C{. Product Liability Standards: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Com
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IV. CONSTITUTIONAL OBJECTIONS TO THE REGULATIONS

The industry already has filed lawsuits challenging the
proposed restrictions as inconsistent with both the statute and
the First Amendment.228 In seeking to prevent tobacco compa
nies from encouraging illegal tobacco use by minors, the FDA's
advertising restrictions will affect "commercial speech" signifi
cantly. The Agency also proposes to require industry-wide partic
ipation in an educational campaign directed at potential and
actual underage tobacco users. This aspect of the initiatives will
be even more vulnerable to legal challenge under the First
Amendment than some of the other advertising and point-of-sale
limitations.
In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation v. Public
Service Commission,229 the Supreme Court developed a four
part test to determine whether a restriction on commercial
speech exceeds First Amendnient limitations:
For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least
must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask
whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both
inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether the
regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted,
and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve
that interest.23o

merce, Consumer Protection, and Competitiveness of the House Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 103d Congo 196 (1994) (statement of William Nealon, Vice President &
General Counsel of Telectronics Pacing Systems) (In light of recent preemption
decisions, "we firmly believe that tort reform has already arrived for medical device
manufacturers.").
228. See supra note 20. For the FDA's response to various and sundry other
constitutional arguments, including "takings" and due process challenges to the
restriction on the use of brand-names, see, e.g., 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,550-56,
44,428-29 (1996); see also Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC, 562 F.2d 749, 758-59 (D.C.
Cir. 1977) (holding that a corrective advertising cease and desist order did not
constitute a taking).
229. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
230. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. The four-part analysis in Central Hudson
was reaffirmed recently in the Court's decision to overturn a prohibition on the dis
closure of alcohol content in the labeling of beer. See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.,
115 S. Ct. 1585 (1995); see also 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct.
1495, 1508-10 (1996) (plurality) (striking down state prohibition against alcohol price
advertising as unconstitutional under the Central Hudson test, and suggesting an
even stricter test for scrutinizing such outright prohibitions on commercial speech);
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In other words, assuming that the speech does not relate to
some unlawful activity and is not inherently misleading, the
government may restrict commercial speech only to achieve a
substantial interest, and then only to the extent necessary.

A Government Interest in Controlling Tobacco Advertising
The Central Hudson test asks first whether the speech in
question is false or relates to some illegal activity; if so, it is not
protected by the First Amendment and may be banned altogeth
er.231 The government has not suggested that existing labeling
and advertising of tobacco products is false, and tobacco compa
nies have refrained from expressly urging underage use. None
theless, the FDA could take the position that certain types of
tobacco advertising encourage unlawful use or are inherently
misleading. Curiously, in defending the constitutionality of its
proposed restrictions on tobacco advertising, the FDA did not
initially argue that such advertising promotes an unlawful activ
ity or is inherently misleading.232 In the preamble accompany
ing the final regulations, the Agency suggested but did not rely
upon this argument. 233

id. at 1522 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) ("Because Rhode Island's regula
tion fails even the less stringent standard set out in Central Hudson, nothing here
requires adoption of a new analysis for the evaluation of commercial speech regula
tion.").
.
231. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566; see also United States v. Edge Broad.
Co., 509 U.S. 418, 426-30 (1993) (upholding a federal statute restricting broadcast
advertising of lotteries if unlawful within a state); Village of Hoffman Estates v.
Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 509 U.S. 418, 426-30 (1982) (rejecting First Amend
ment challenge to ordinance guidelines which regulate the sale of drug paraphernalia
within a certain proximity of any literature encouraging the use of illegal drugs);
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 388
(1973) ("We have no doubt that a newspaper constitutionally could be forbidden to
publish a want ad proposing a sale of narcotics or soliciting prostitutes.").
232. See 60 Fed. Reg. 41,314, 41,354 (1995) ("The Central Hudson analysis begins
with the second prong.").
233. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,470-72; cf. Vincent Blasi & Henry P. Monaghan, The
First Amendment and Cigarette Advertising, 256 JAMA 502, 506 (1986) (arguing that
cigarette advertising is deceptive and misleading); Kenneth L. Polin, Argument for
the Ban of Tobacco Advertising: A First Amendment Analysis, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV.
99, 113 (1988) (arguing that tobacco product advertising is inherently misleading and
can thus be banned without violating constitutional protections for commercial
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Assuming that the commercial speech is neither false nor
misleading, the second prong of the Central Hudson test asks
whether the asserted government interest in enacting the regu
lation is substantial.234 The FDA simply notes that it has a sig
nificant interest in protecting the public health by reducing
smoking among youngsters and proceeds to the third prong of
the analysis. 235 The government undoubtedly has a legitimate
interest in reducing the number of minors who begin smoking,
both to protect the health of those individuals and to reduce the
cost to society in caring for them when they suffer from tobacco
related illnesses.236
B. The Nexus Between Means and Ends

Assuming the existence of a substantial government inter
est, the next question is whether the regulation directly advanc
es the asserted interests.237 Although the FDA takes comfort in
the Supreme Court's willingness in one recent case to accept
anecdotal evidence in support of a restriction on commercial
speech,238 the Court generally has been reluctant to allow inspeech).
234. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566; see also Posadas de Puerto Rico
Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 341 (1986) (holding that the
legislature's interest in promoting the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens by
reducing their demand for gambling is substantial and justifies the regulation of
gambling advertising).
235. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,472-73.
236. See, e.g., id. at 44,399; Jane E. Brody, Study in Massachusetts Finds That
Cigarettes Stunt Lungs of Young Smokers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1996, at A8. To the
extent that the FDA asserts a collateral goal of reducing consumption by adults
exposed to the same types of advertising, the proposed restrictions may be harder to
justify under the remaining prongs of the Central Hudson test. See 44 Liquormart,
Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1508 (1996) (plurality) ("The First Amendment
directs us to be especially skeptical of regulations that seek to keep people in the
dark for what the government perceives to be their own good."); see also id. at 1516
(Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) (concluding that such an interest is "per se
illegitimate").
237. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564 (explaining that "the regulatory
technique must be in proportion to that interest" and "must be designed carefully to
achieve the State's goal").
238. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,474; Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 115 S. Ct.
2371, 2377:78 (1995) ("The anecdotal record mustered by the Bar is noteworthy for
its breadth and detail . . . . In any event, we do not read our case law to require
that empirical data come to us accompanied by a surfeit of background informa
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terference with protected speech on the basis of such tenuous
connections.239 In Rubin u. Coors Brewing CO.,240 for example,
the Court emphasized that the government shoulders the burden
of showing that a restriction advances its asserted interests "in a
direct and material way."241
The FDA has gathered a wealth of evidence regarding the
association between promotion and the use of cigarettes and
smokeless tobacco products by minors.242 The Agency also has
collected evidence, including reports of success in other coun
tries, to demonstrate that advertising restrictions reduce con
sumption.243 Thus, it concludes, the restrictions directly ad
vance the government's legitimate interest in protecting public
health.244 The Agency's restrictions on advertising (such as
text-only format, the ban on promotional items, and restrictions
on sponsorship) seem likely to reduce demand for cigarettes
among the adolescent population to some extent,245 though

tion."}. The Court was sharply divided on this and other aspects of the case. See
Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. at 2384 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("Our cases require some
thing more than a few pages of self-serving and unsupported statements by the
State to demonstrate that a regulation directly and materially advances the
elimination of a real harm when the State seeks to suppress truthful and
nondeceptive speech.").
239. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 569 (noting that the link between the
advertising prohibition and the utility's rate structure was tenuous, even if there
was an "immediate connection" between the advertising at issue and the demand for
electricity: "[T]he Commission's laudable concern over the equity and efficiency of
appellant's rates does not provide a constitutionally adequate reason for restricting
protected speech."); see also Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770-71 (1993) (explain
ing that the government's burden is not satisfied by "mere speculation or conjec
ture").
240. 115 S. Ct. 1585 (1995).
241. See Rubin, 115 S. Ct. at 1592; 44 Liquormart, Inc., 116 S. Ct. at 1509-10
(plurality) (finding inadequate evidence to support the state's claim that its ban on
alcohol price advertising would promote temperance).
242. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,488-89 (summarizing the evidence); id. at 44,466-69,
44,475-88, 44,494-95 (detailing the evidence).
243. See id. at 44,489-93.
244. See id. at 44,495.
245. See Erica Swecker, Note, Joe Camel: Will ·Old Joe" Survive?, 36 WM. &
MARy L. REV. 1519, 1522-25 (1995); Timothy Noah, Study Says Minors Respond
More to Cigarette Ads Than Do Adults, WAIL ST. J., Apr. 4, 1996, at B8 (summariz
ing a new study finding that advertising influenced adolescent smokers' preferences
among cigarette brands). But see 44 Liquormart, Inc., 116 S. Ct. at 1509-10 (plu
rality) (discounting the value of evidence concerning the purported link between price
advertising and the level of alcohol consumption).
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forced reductions in the billions of dollars spent annually by the
tobacco industry for advertising could lead to greater price com
petition, which might increase purchasing by minors. 246
Finally, even if the advertising restrictions would be effec
tive in reducing adolescent tobacco use, the regulations seem
vulnerable under the final prong of the Central Hudson test,247
which requires that a restriction be no more extensive than nec
essary to achieve the government's goal.246 The preamble in
cludes a detailed explanation to justify each of its advertising
limitations. 249 Nonetheless, some of the FDA's restrictions fail
to differentiate between advertisements directed at minors, in
whose welfare the government asserts the substantial interest in
this context, and advertisements directed at adults.250 More

246. See Daniel Helberg, Note, Butt Out: An Analysis of the FDA's Proposed Re
strictions on Cigarette Advertising Under the Commercial Speech Doctrine, 29 LoY.
LA L. REV. 1219, 1260 (1996). The FDA dismisses this possibility with little discus
sion. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,511. It concedes elsewhere that the industry will save
money but speculates that the unspent advertising budgets will be redirected as
increased dividends for shareholders or investments in other product lines. See id. at
44,570. Perhaps the money will be absorbed by mounting legal bills.
247. See Helberg, supra note 246, at 1258-66; David Cole, Muzzling Joe Camel,
LEGAL TIMES, May 6, 1996, at 22; cf. Lars Noah & Barbara A. Noah, Liberating
Commercial Speech: Product Labeling Controls and the First Amendment, 47 FLA. L.
REv. 63, 99-104 (1995) (evaluating the FDA's food labeling restrictions on health
claims); Rosanna Tainbunni, Tough Restrictions on Tobacco Ads Struck Down By
High Court, WALL ST. J., Sept. 22, 1995, at B2 (discussing Canadian decision).
248. See, e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1505,
1510 n.13 (1993).
[W]hile we have rejected the "least-restrictive-means" test for judging restric
tions on commercial speech, so too have we rejected mere rational basis re
view . . . . [I]f there are numerous and obvious less-burdensome alternatives
to the restriction on commercial speech, that is certainly a relevant consider
ation in determining whether the "fit" between ends and means is reasonable.
In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982); see also Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
249. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,500-37, 44,610. The FDA repeatedly explains that
adults will continue to have access to informational advertising through the text-only
format (and to unrestricted advertising in adult publications and establishments) bu',
that children will no longer be exposed to appealing colors and imagery. For an
argument that such restrictions violate the Constitution, see Martin H. Redish,
Tobacco Advertising and the First Amendment, 81 IOWA L. REV. 589, 625-30, 638
(1996). According to Professor Redish, only the restrictions on tobacco advertising in
the vicinity of schools or playgrounds pass First Amendment muster. See id. at 608.
250. Cf. Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 131 (1989) (invalidating re
striction on phone-sex services that "has the invalid effect of limiting the content of
adult telephone conversations to that which is suitable for children to hear"); Penn
Adver., Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 63 F.3d 1318, 1325-26 (4th Cir. 1995) (rejecting
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over, the government should consider less restrictive alterna
tives, such as legislation to increase taxes on tobacco products or
even more stringent restrictions on access.251 In fact, lawmak
ers have proposed major tax increases on the sale of cigarettes,
which would reduce sales (especially among youngsters) without
infringing on constitutionally protected speech.252
The FDA originally had argued, among other things, that
the government's greater power to ban tobacco products includes
the lesser power to regulate extensively the advertising of these
products,253 and that it has "greater leeway" to regulate
"speech with regard to socially harmful activities."254 In its lat
est commercial speech decision, however, the Supreme Court
soundly rejected these arguments.255 Recognizing the weak
nesses of its initial defense, the Agency included in the final

First Amendment challenge to a city's prohibition on all cigarette billboard advertis
ing justified as a way to reduce underage smoking), vacated, 116 S. Ct. 2575 (1996),
reinstated, 1996 U.S. App. L~S 29462 (4th Cir. Nov. 13, 1996).
251. See 44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1510 ("[H]igher [alcohol] prices can be
maintained either by direct regulation or by increased taxation."); id. at 1522
(O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
252. See John Schmeltzer & Michael Arndt, Under Siege in Cigarette Wars,
Tobacco Titans Counterattack, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 25, 1994, at 1. Commentators on the'
proposed tax increase note that, because minors have less disposable income than
adults, there will be a greater reduction in overall tobacco consumption by minors.
See David Bourne et al., The Effect of Raising State and Federal Tobacco Tax, 38 J.
FAM. PRAc. 300 (1994); see also 60 Fed. Reg. 41,314, 41,324 (1995) ("Young people,
who generally have little disposable income, can be particularly sensitive to the price
of cigarettes and may choose not to smoke as the price increases."); cf. 61 Fed. Reg.
at 44,453 ("The agency cannot act on these comments as it lacks the authority to
levy taxes or mandate prices.")..
253. See 60 Fed. Reg. at 41,355 (citing Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tour
ism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 345-46 (1986».
254. Id. (claiming that Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 115 S. Ct. 1595 (1995), is
not contrary).
255. See 44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1511-13 ("The reasoning in Posadas does
support the State's argument, but, on reflection, we are now persuaded that Posadas
erroneously performed the First Amendment analysis," including its significant
deference to a state legislature's choice of means, its "greater-includes-the-Iesser"
reasoning, and its supposed "vice" exception.); id. at 1513 ("As the entire Court
apparently now agrees, the statements in the Posadas opinion on which Rhode
Island relies are no longer persuasive."); id. at 1522 (O'Connor, J., concurring in
judgment) ("The closer look that we have required since Posadas comports better
with the purpose of the analysis set out in Central Hudson . .••"); see also Coors,
115 S. Ct. at 1589-91 n.2 (rejecting government's suggestion that it has "broader
latitude to regulate speech that promotes socially harmful activities"); City of
Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750, 763 (1988).
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preamble a more sophisticated response to these constitutional
objections.256 Although one may quibble with some of the ad
vertising restrictions, a reviewing court will probably sustain
their constitutionality on the strength of the evidentiary record
amassed by the FDA in this case.

C. Special Concerns About Industry-Funded Counteradvertising
The proposed requirement that the tobacco industry spend
$150 million each year to broadcast anti-smoking messages
poses additional First Amendment difficulties. The FDA, origi
nally taking refuge in language from the statute's restricted
device provisions, concluded that "an educational program about
cigarettes and smokeless tobacco products is a restriction that is
necessary because of the 'potentiality for harmful effect' of [to
bacco] products."257 The Agency asserted that a national educa
tional campaign is necessary to counteract the effects of the
"appealing images" associated with smoking which have been
perpetuated in the tobacco industry's advertising campaigns,
and it summarized the evidence from independent studies to
demonstrate the likely effectiveness of an industry-sponsored
campaign.256 But a requirement that the tobacco industry en

256. See 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,496·500.
257. See 60 Fed. Reg. at 41,350. Educational campaigns sometimes are mentioned
as a possible alternative to a restriction on commercial speech, but courts assume a
government·sponsored campaign and, in any event, can only speculate about its
likely effectiveness. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, 116 S. Ct. at 1510 ("Even educational
campaigns focused on the problems of. . . drinking might prove to be more ef
fective."); see also id. at 1522 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
258. See 60 Fed. Reg. at 41,326·27; see also 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,538·39, 44,590;
supra note 149 (describing the success of such programs in California and Mas·
sachusetts). Some critics believe that the approach could, however, prove to be
counterproductive. See Carlo DiClemente, Will the Regulations Work?, HEALTH L.
NEWS, Sept. 1995, at 6 (arguing that "societal efforts must avoid increasing attention
to cigarettes, even if in a negative manner, or creating restrictions that would
increase black market demand. Efforts to curb smoking . . . can have a reverse
effect by creating a rebellious, recalcitrant cohort of smokers."); see also Robert S.
Adler & R. David Pittle, Cajolery or Command: Are Education Campaigns an Ade·
quate Substitute for Regulation?, 1 YALE J. ON REG. 159, 162·64 (1984); Lawrence O.
Gostin & Allan M. Brandt, Criteria for Evaluating a Ban on the Advertisement of
Cigarettes: Balancing Public Health Benefits with Constitutional Burdens, 269 JAMA
904, 906 (1993); Alan Schwartz, Views of Addiction and the Duty to Warn, 75 VA. L.
REV. 509, 556·57 (1989).
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gage in such counter-speech, ostensibly to correct misleading im
pressions from past promotional activities, contravenes the
Constitution's special distrust of "forced" speech.
The First Amendment has been interpreted to include not
only a right of free speech but also the right to refrain from
speech which is abhorrent to the speaker.259 The Supreme
Court has refused, for instance, to uphold orders requiring a
corporation to associate itself with speech which the corporation
may disagree with. 260 The FDA's proposal was not just a limi
tation on labeling or advertising; instead, it would force the
tobacco industry to speak. Rather than imposing a company
specific requirement or limitation to correct an identifiable past
violation, the proposal sought to appropriate millions of dollars
for an advertising campaign that would require industry en
dorsement of positions which the industry opposes. The First
Amendment protects freedom of thought against state action,
and this freedom includes both the right to speak freely and the
right to refrain from speaking.261
In defending its original proposal, the FDA never directly
acknowledged this forced speech concern, although it cited deci
sions upholding "corrective" advertising orders imposed by other

259. See, e.g., Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235 (1977) (holding
that employees could not be compelled to pay union dues); Wooley v. Maynard, 430
U.S. 705, 713 (1977) <holding that a state may not constitutionally require a motor
ist to display motto on license plate which conflicts with motorist's political, religious
or moral beliefs); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. I, 11-21
(1986) (holding that a public utilities commission could not, under the First Amend
ment, require a utility to include in its billing envelopes a third-party newsletter
containing assertions regarding energy use with which the utility might disagree).
260. See Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 15-17 (noting that, "[w]ere the government
freely able to compel corporate speakers to propound political messages with which
they disagree, this [First Amendment] protection would be empty"); see also Interna
tional Dairy Foods Ass'n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 72 (2d Cir. 1996) (granting prelim
inary injunctions against enforcement of state law requiring the disclosure of rBST
use in the labeling of dairy products because "[t]he statute in question indisputably
requires [manufacturers] to speak when they would rather not"); Wileman Bros. &
Elliott, Inc. v. Espy, 58 F.3d 1367, 1380 (9th Cir. 1995) ("[A]1though we agree that
the Secretary [of Agriculture] has a substantial interest in promoting peaches and
nectarines, we hold that forced contributions to pay for generic advertising programs
contravene the First Amendment rights of the handlers."), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct.
1875 (1996).
261. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 1511, 1519-22
(1995); Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 795-98 (1988); Miami
Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256-57 (1974).

62

Alabama Law Review

[Vol. 48:1:1

agencies. 262 Although courts have upheld limited corrective ad
vertising orders in the past,263 the Agency's proposed plan far
exceeds a traditional FTC cease and desist requirement. 2M No
agency has ever successfully mandated corrective advertising on
an industry-wide basis. The FDA pointed to an educational re
quirement for hearing aids as an example of a previous compa
ny-financed educational message/55 but hearing aid manufac
turers must distribute to purchasers only an informative bro
chure with their products,266 a requirement that differs little
from typical labeling regulations. 267 By comparison, an educa
tional campaign cannot possibly target only potential adolescent
users of a particular company's tobacco products.
V. CONCLUSION

The FDA's goal of substantially reducing the rate of tobacco
use among adolescents is laudable, but the Agency has failed to

262. See 60 Fed. Reg. at 41,356. Although the final regulations do not include
this requirement, the Agency explained that it would use its "notification" authority
to order companies to undertake some counteradvertising.· See 61 Fed. Reg. at 44,538
("Because the education campaign will not be a requirement of this final rule, the
agency need not respond to the many comments that it received ••••"). The FDA
nevertheless briefly responded to some of the comments, though not with regard to
the constitutional issues.
263. See, e.g., National Comm'n on Egg Nutrition v. FrC, 570 F.2d 157, 164 (7th
Cir. 1977) (modifying overbroad corrective advertising order); cf. Warner-Lambert Co.
v. FrC, 562 F.2d 749, 762 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (upholding FrC corrective advertising
order where a manufacturer had made false and misleading statements about the
efficacy of its mouthwash product, Listerine, in the prevention, cure, treatment, and
mitigation of colds and severe sore throats).
264. The FDA's broad rulemaking approach differs significantly from the FrC's
case-by-case adjudication of misleading advertising claims. See Richard S. Higgins &
Fred S. McChesney, Truth and Consequences: The Federal Trade Commission's Ad
Substantiation Program, in PuBLIC CHOICE AND REGULATION: A VIEW FROM INSIDE
THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 181, 182-84 (Robert J. Mackay et al. eds., 1987);
Arthur Best, Controlling False Advertising: A Comparative Study of Public Regula
tion, Industry Self-Policing, and Private Litigation, 20 GA. L. REV. 1, 16-20 (1985).
265. See 60 Fed. Reg. at 41,351.
266. See 21 C.F.R. § 801.420(cX3) (1996). The Agency argues that it is impossible
to set up a regulatory scheme which would involve only the dissemination of limited,
targeted information to those adolescents who are susceptible to taking up smoking
and that, therefore, a nationwide campaign is necessary. See 60 Fed. Reg. at 41,351.
267. See Noah & Noah, supra note 247, at 105-07 (discussing possible constitu
tional objections to product warning label requirements).
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appreciate (or admit) the limitations of its statutory authority
and some of the other weaknesses of its regulations. The initia
tive still may succeed in prompting a more moderate legislative
response to the problem. In the meantime, however, the FDA
may have done itself irreparable harm and diverted valuable
time and resources from matters that it clearly does have re
sponsibility to control.

